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Transnational Land Acquisitions (TLA): an evaluation of current 
legal frameworks and global regulatory responses from a human 
rights perspective  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have witnessed a rush by foreign governments and international investors 
to acquire farmland across the global South. According to data collected by Oxfam, 
227 million hectares of agricultural land – an area nearly twice the size of South Africa 
– was negotiated for sale or lease between 2001 and 2011, mostly to international 
investors.
1
 Although the land rush is a global phenomena, the World Bank estimates 
that seventy-five percent of the farmland under negotiation has been in Africa,
2
 which 
will be the geographical focus of this paper. The acquisition of land by foreign actors 
in low-income countries does have antecedents in the colonial land transfers of the 
past, and the typical scenario of a ‘finance rich, resource poor’ state or state-backed 
investor acquiring land in a ‘finance poor, resource rich’ country still predominates. 
However, the new wave of land transfers involves a multiplicity of novel actors and a 
range of both short and long term driving factors that set it apart from the North-South 
imperialist tradition. What is often referred to as ‘the global land rush’ must be 
situated in ‘an era of advanced capitalism, multiple global crises, and the role of new 
configurations of power and resistance in global governance institutions.
3
 Trade and 
financial liberalisation since the 1980s has made it easier to invest abroad and brought 
a range of previously nationally or locally controlled economic resources – including 
land – into the supply chain of the global market. Inter-linked energy, climate, 
environmental and financial crises contributed to the unprecedented food price rises of 
2007-2008, which stimulated further interest in agricultural land. However, research 
suggests that the long-term impact of these events has and will continue to be 
increasing commercial pressures on land, whose value to investors has soared 
alongside rising demand.  
                                                          
1
 Oxfam ‘Land and Power: The growing scandals surrounding the new wave of investments in land’ 
(2011) 2. 
2
 K Deininger & D Byerlee et al ‘Rising global interest in farmland: Can it yield sustainable and 
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Transnational land acquisitions (TLA) are promoted by international 
development agencies such as the World Bank as part of a ‘win-win’ process whereby 
profitable investment stimulates much needed agricultural and rural development in 
low-income countries.
4
 However, there has been widespread opposition to TLA from 
international and national NGOs, UN agencies, rural peoples associations and other 
groups, who question the developmental benefits of TLA on a number of grounds, the 
most common of which is the threat they pose to food and tenure security.
5
 Though 
exact numbers are not available, due in large part to the secrecy in which many land 
acquisitions are conducted, evidence suggests that many thousands (perhaps hundreds 
of thousands) of rural farmers and other land users have been dispossessed of their 
land (often without compensation) or otherwise had their human rights violated as a 
consequence of TLA.  
The global land rush is a complex phenomena that cuts across the fields of 
development, international trade and investment, global governance, and international 
struggles for the protection and promotion of human rights. Scholars are beginning to 
shed light on these different aspects; in particular, the agro-economic impact of the 
global land rush has been widely discussed.
6
 However, the legal and governance 
questions raised by TLA have received less attention. This paper responds to this 
knowledge gap by responding to the legal and governance (as opposed to the wider 
developmental) questions raised by TLA. It will show that the current international, 
regional and domestic legal frameworks that govern TLA provide excellent security 
for foreign investments in land but fail to adequately protect the human rights of the 
rural land users affected by those investments.  
The legal frameworks that regulate TLA are also complex. They traverse 
national and international jurisdictional boundaries and are conceived, monitored and 
enforced by a plethora of institutions. Nevertheless, international trade and investment 
treaties that prioritise the security of capital over the human rights of affected 
                                                          
4
 World Bank op cit note 2. 
5
 See Oxfam op cit note 1. 
6
 For major mapping and analytical studies on the global land rush see J Franco et al 'The Global Land 
Grab: A primer' (Feb, 2013) Transnational Institute (TNI); A Ward et al ‘Land Rights and the Rush for 
Land: Findings of the Global Commercial Pressures on Land Research Project’ (2012) International 
Land Coalition (ILC). For analysis of the agro-economic and developmental impacts of transnational 
land acquisitions see Lorenzo et al ‘Land grab or development opportunity? Agricultural investment and 
international land deals in Africa’ (2009) IIED/FAO/IFAD; International Assessment of Agricultural 
Knowledge, Science, and Technology for Development (IAASTD) ‘Global Report: Agriculture at a 
Crossroads’ McIntyre et al (eds) (2008). 
  4 
communities have predominated over less enforceable human rights instruments, as 
well as over national laws in target states.  
This paper will provide an outline of the multiplicity of legal frameworks that 
regulate TLA and evaluate the extent to which these frameworks are promoting and 
protecting human rights. The four major global regulatory and standard setting 
responses to TLA will then be delineated in order to assess whether they are capable of 
enhancing the legal protection of human rights for communities affected by TLA. 
Chapter II will define TLA and map the history, scale, and human rights 
impact of the rush for land in Africa, including setting out the source and the content 
of the rights commonly being infringed. Case studies will highlight specific incidences 
of human rights violations resulting from TLA. 
Chapter III will then consider the trade, investment and human rights 
frameworks – international, regional, and national – that comprise the current system 
of legal regulation for foreign investments in land. It will be shown that the legal 
regimes currently in place for TLA do not offer sufficient protection for the human 
rights of affected communities.  
In Chapter IV the four major international responses to TLA, all of which have 
emerged in the past five years, will be reviewed from a human rights perspective. 
These are the minimum principles and measures to address the human rights challenge 
of large-scale land acquisitions promulgated by the United Nations Special Rapporteur 
on the right to food and endorsed by the Human Rights Council; the International 
Finance Corporation’s inclusion of Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement as 
a specific category of concern in its influential and recently updated Performance 
Standards; the Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture (PRAI) jointly 
developed by the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development; and the Voluntary Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of 
National Food Security agreed between governments, civil society and international 
agencies and endorsed by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations (FAO), the Committee on World Food Security, the G20 and the UN General 
Assembly. 
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The paper will conclude with an overall assessment of the extent to which the 
regulatory environment for TLA is now conducive to effectively promoting and 
protecting human rights, and what further measures can be taken to fulfil this end. 
 
II. THE GLOBAL LAND RUSH: BACKGROUND AND DEFINITION, DRIVING 
FACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACTS 
 
(a)  Background 
(i)  The scale of the global land rush 
The most comprehensive effort to document the scale of the global land rush to date is 
a combined civil society effort called ‘The Land Matrix Global Observatory’.
7
 The 
Matrix is a land monitoring initiative that collates information on TLA and publishes it 
online. It records land deals that are two-hundred hectares (ha) or more in size; include 
the transfer of rights to use and own land to a foreign investor; and which can be 
triangulated and cross-referenced for accuracy. Reliable and exact data on the scale of 
the global land rush is, however, inherently hard to establish. The authors of the 
Matrix cite a number of reasons for why this is the case.
8
 Most importantly, the 
controversial nature of land deals means that they are often shrouded in secrecy. 
Negotiations tend to involve high-ranking officials and take place outside the public 
realm. Official data is often not recorded and decisions are not reported publicly. The 
entire process of a land deal can therefore be beyond the purview of the media or civil 
society, meaning that much of the data available on land deals comes from unofficial 
sources. Though all sources and data are checked for reliability, and a growing 
network of accredited monitors is in the process of being established, due to the 
geographical scale and distribution of TLA, many deals cannot be guaranteed, while 
many others may never come to the attention of the Matrix. These limitations, coupled 
with the limited research and awareness of TLA in most developing countries, leads 
                                                          
7
 The Land Matrix Global Observatory. International Land Coalition (ILC), Centre de Cooperation 
Internationale en Recherché Agronomique pour le Developpement (CIRAD), Centre for Development 
and Environment (CDE), German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) & Deutsche 
Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) www.landmatrix.org. 
8
 Ibid ‘How reliable is the data?’ www.landmatrix.org/about/. 
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the authors of the project to conclude that ‘the aggregate figures are likely to be a 
significant underestimation of the scale of land deals.’
9
  
 With this in mind, the Land Matrix currently holds information about 944 land 
deals concluded since 2000, with a further 182 ‘intended’ deals still under 
negotiation.
10
 The total land area covered by these deals is 50 million ha, or more than 
three times the size of the Western Cape. All of these deals involve the transfer of land 
to international investors. 
 Oxfam has conducted one desk study that used a less stringent set of qualifying 
criteria for recording land deals, including relying heavily on information provided by 
media reports. It found that 227 million ha of land – an area nearly twice the size of 
South Africa – had been negotiated for sale or lease between 2001 and 2011, mostly to 
international investors.
11
 The World Bank’s 2011 study on the global land rush found 
that large-scale farmland acquisitions were becoming more common all over the 
world, particularly since the world food crisis of 2007-2008. It calculated that average 
annual expansion of global farmland was 4 million ha per annum before 2008, but this 




(ii)  Focus on Africa 
The global land rush is affecting agrarian economies mainly in Africa and Asia. Forty-
six percent of the concluded or intended deals recorded by the Land Matrix were in 
Africa, with thirty-six percent in Asia (the vast majority of which in South-East Asia), 
fourteen percent in South America, and the remaining four percent spread across the 
rest of the world.
13
 The World Bank’s 2011 study suggests that Africa accounts for an 
even higher proportion of TLA, with three-quarters of large-scale farmland deals 
recorded by the Bank in 2009 being in Africa. It also found that, of the estimated 446 
million ha of globally noncultivated land suitable for farming that is not forested, 
protected or populated with more that twenty-five people per square kilometre, 201 
million ha are in sub-Saharan Africa, which if cropped, would increase globally 




 All figures published on www.landmatrix.org, last checked 07 Feb 2014. 
11
 Oxfam op cit note 1 at 2. 
12
 World Bank op cit note 2 at XIV. 
13
 Land Matrix ‘By target region’ www.landmatrix.org/get-the-detail/by-target-region/. 
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cropped land by a third.
14
 Though the land rush is a phenomenon occurring across the 
global South, this paper will focus on Africa because this is where land deals are most 
prevalent and most likely to continue. Africa is also an appropriate focal area because 
African agriculture has on average the highest yield gaps as a result of historical 
underinvestment,
15
 and has the most non-cropped arable land of any continent.
16
 
Investors are therefore looking to cash in on the continents great potential for agro-
economic growth. Africa also provides an interesting case study because on no other 
continent is the smallholder agriculture affected by TLA more widespread; it has many 
of the weakest land governance regimes and states typically offer the least protection 




(iii)  Defining transnational land acquisitions  
This paper uses the term ‘transnational land acquisition’, or TLA, to refer to the 
purchase, lease, or gaining of a concession by an international investor to land in 
excess of two-hundred hectares in a foreign country. Such acquisitions are often 
labelled as ‘land grabbing’ by their detractors. The ‘Tirana Declaration’ adopted by 
more than 150 civil society organisations defines land grabbing as acquisitions of land 
that are one or more of the following: 
(i) In violation of human rights, particularly the equal rights of women; (ii) not based 
on Free, Prior and Informed Consent of the affected land-users; (iii) not based on a 
thorough assessment, or are in disregard of social, economic and environmental 
impacts, including the way they are gendered; (iv) not based on transparent contracts 
that specify clear and binding commitments about activities, employment and 
benefits sharing, and; (v) not based on effective democratic planning, independent 
oversight and meaningful participation.
18
 
This paper is concerned with how the current regulatory environment permits ‘land 
grabbing’ as described above to take place. However, not all land deals meet this 
description. To use the term ‘land grabbing’ to describe all land deals would therefore 
be misleading. In reality, the nature of each land deal varies considerably, from what 
                                                          
14
 World Bank op cit note 2 at XXXIV. 
15
 Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the right to food’ HRC Res 10/12 UN Doc A/HRC/13/33/Add.2 (28 Dec 2009) addendum, “Large-scale 
land acquisitions and leases: A set of minimum principles and measures to address the human rights 
challenge”’ para 7. 
16
 World Bank op cit note 2 at XXXI and XXXVII.  
17
 See infra section c of this chapter. 
18
 Tirana Declaration: Securing land access for the poor in times of intensified natural resources 
competition (2011) www.landcoalition.org/about-us/aom2011/tirana-declaration. 
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might be considered an illegal and secretive ‘grab’, to legally acquired leases that 
respect the human rights of local land users.  
In the academic literature, the phrase ‘large-scale land acquisitions’ (LSLA) 
has also been widely used. However, LSLA includes acquisitions of land by domestic 
as well as foreign actors, whereas this paper is concerned with the legal regulation of 
transnational land acquisitions, which have their own unique characteristics.  
According to the Land Matrix, seventy-seven percent of land acquisitions are 
for the purposes of agriculture, thirteen percent for forestry, and ten percent for the 
purposes of tourism, industry or conservation.
19
 TLA includes acquisitions of land for 
all of these purposes. The acquisition of land for the purposes of natural resource 
extraction is a separate field of study, with its own dynamics, actors and regulatory 
frameworks, and is therefore not considered as TLA. 
 
(iv)  Historical linkages 
The desire by foreigners to acquire and control land in Africa has a long history, and 
the links between today’s wave of land acquisitions and Africa’s colonial past have 
been discussed by a variety of scholars.
20
 For the purposes of this paper, two features 
that distinguish today’s land acquisitions in Africa from those of the past will be 
discussed. The present section will review the unique and expanded range of factors 
that are driving today’s land rush forward, and the impact that these are having on the 
human rights of rural land users. Chapter III will then delineate the complexity of the 
contemporary legal frameworks under which TLA occur. 
 
(b)  Driving factors of the global land rush 
A convergence of short and long-term events linked to various global crises are 
putting unprecedented commercial pressures on land, which is becoming an 
increasingly valuable resource to a range of investors.
21
 It is possible, however, to 
                                                          
19
 Land Matrix  ‘Dynamics Overview’ www.landmatrix.org/get-the-idea/dynamics-overview/. 
20
 See NL Peluso & C Lund ‘New frontiers of land control: Introduction’ (2011) 38:4 Journal of 
Peasant Studies 667. 
21
 For a comprehensive analysis of the factors driving the global land rush see Anseeuw et al ‘Land 
Rights and the Rush for Land: Findings of the Global Commercial Pressures on Land Research Project’ 
(2012) ILC. 
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identify three overarching and interlinked factors that are driving the land rush 
forward. These are: food insecurity; ongoing energy, climate and environmental crises; 
and the increasing role played by foreign investment and markets in all aspects of 
development. 
 
(i)  Food insecurity and the acquisition of land for agro-exports 
The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) predicts that 
global food production will have to increase by seventy percent by 2050 if the world’s 
growing, more urban and richer populations are to be adequately fed. It has 
consistently argued that today’s world food system is not working because already 
over one billion people go hungry each day.
22
 At the same time that many developing 
countries are struggling to feed their own populations, net food-importing countries 
such as China, India, South Korea and the Gulf and Middle Eastern states, who have 
growing populations and economies but limited arable land, are seeking new ways to 
guarantee their own food security. There are now many examples of governments and 
investors from these countries acquiring land overseas for such purposes, for example: 
 Indian company Varun International has leased 465,000 ha of land in 
Madagascar to grow rice for consumption in India; 
 South Korea has acquired 690,000 ha of land in Sudan to grow wheat for 
domestic consumption; 
 The United Arab Emirates has invested in 400,000 ha of Sudanese land to 
grow a variety of crops for export back to the Gulf; 
 Libya has leased 100,000 ha of land in Mali for rice production.23 
Simultaneously, the expansion of the middle-classes in emerging economies such as 
the BRICS is creating demands for more luxurious diets that include more meat and 
exotic food products, which is increasing demand for grazing land, land for animal 
feed, and fertile land for other high-demand crops.
24
 Incentives to acquire land abroad 
for the purposes of food security and rising middle-class consumer demand were 
                                                          
22
 FAO ‘How to Feed the World in 2050’ (2009). 
www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/wsfs/docs/expert_paper/How_to_Feed_the_World_in_2050.pdf. 
23
 Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter op cit note 15 at 6 n6-n8. 
24
 See T Weis ‘The Accelerating Biophysical Contradictions of Industrial Capitalist Agriculture’ (2010) 
10:3 Journal of Agrarian Change 315. 
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multiplied by the world food crisis of 2007-2008. The causes of the world food crisis 
have received much attention and include rising oil and other commodity prices, 
increasing demand for biofuels diverting existing food stocks, and the depreciation of 
the U.S. dollar linked to the financial crisis.
25
 Though many of the factors driving the 
land rush are long-term, the food crisis was a turning point because it highlighted – 
especially for food-insecure countries – just how unstable and uncertain the current 
world food system is. As food prices reached record levels – rising over eighty percent 
in eighteen months
26
 – many countries experienced food riots, some of which evolved 
into the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings.
27
 For the first time in decades, Russia, one of the 
world’s major grain exporters, enacted export restrictions on a variety of crops. This 
event, and the ‘beggar thy neighbour’ policies that followed from other food-
exporters, perhaps more than any other, dramatically illustrated to food-importing 
nations the need to have more control over their food supply. Since at least 2000, and 
in an accelerated fashion since 2007, many have been seeking to acquire land overseas 
in order to produce food directly for export, and are targeting countries, often in 
Africa, where production costs are lower, land governance weaker, and land and water 
more abundant than in their own territories.
28
  
Information extracted from the Land Matrix shows that seventy-seven percent 
of TLA are for the purposes of agriculture. Of this, twenty-five percent are for the 
export of food crops, twenty-two percent for non-food crops (mainly biofuels), with 





(ii)  Biofuels and the energy, climate and environmental crises 
Rising demand for oil amid uncertainty about on-coming ‘peak oil’ has lead many 
industrialised and emerging countries to look to biofuels as a key component of their 
                                                          
25
 D Headey & S Fan ‘Anatomy of a crisis: the causes and consequences of surging food prices’ (2008) 
39 Agricultural Economics 375. 
26
 K Wellard Dyer ‘Large-scale land deals, food security and local livelihoods’ (2013) Future 
Agricultures Consortium, CAADP Policy Brief 10. 
27
 R Bush ‘Food riots: poverty, power and protest’ (2010) 10 Journal of Agrarian Change 119. 
28 
J von Braun & R Meinzen-Dick '“Land Grabbing” by Foreign Investors in Developing Countries: 
Risks and Opportunities' (13 April 2009) IFPRI Policy Brief 13, 1. 
29
 Land Matrix op cit note 7. 
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future energy needs.
30
 The acquisition of land for the purposes of biofuels production 
is seen as one way of ensuring an affordable and reliable supply of energy that 
decreases reliance on volatile oil markets and can thus help oil-importing countries to 
achieve energy security. 
Industrialised nations are also investing in biofuels as a means of achieving the 
CO
2
 emissions reductions required to limit climate change.
31
 Europe and the United 
States have been at the forefront of such efforts and have both recently passed 
legislation committing themselves to large increases in biofuels production for this 
purpose.
32
 Vast tracts of land are required to grow the amount of biofuels expected by 
this legislation, which has led American and European agro-businesses to look for 
cheap, uncropped land overseas.
33
 As a result of this trend, some estimates have put 




Global environmental decline, linked to both climate change and the 
exploitation of the environment for commercial ends, is also making healthy and 
arable farmland more valuable and increasing competition for land both domestically 
and internationally. Countries facing the worst impacts of environmental decline, such 
as China, are looking to acquire arable land overseas because the quality of their own 
soils and the availability of clean water is diminishing. These aspects of the search for 
land overseas are closely tied to the availability of fresh water supplies, which are also 
on the wane in many parts of the world.
35
 As demand for food continues to rise and 
agricultural production attempts to keep apace, interest in arable land with access to 
abundant fresh water is set to continue to grow exponentially.
36
  
A final environmental factor driving the land rush is the phenomenon of ‘green 
grabbing’, which has been described as ‘the appropriation of land and resources for 
                                                          
30
 See Friends of the Earth ‘Africa: Up For Grabs: The Scale And Impact of Land-Grabbing for 
Agrofuels’ (2010) www.foeeurope.org/agrofuels/FoEE_Africa_up_for_grabs_2010.pdf.  
31
 For criticism of the potential for biofuels to have a significant impact on global CO
2
 emissions see B 
White & A Dasgupta ‘Agrofuels capitalism: a view from political economy’ (2010) 37:4 Journal of 
Peasant Studies 593. 
32
 See the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACES) and the European Union’s 
Renewable Energy Directive of 2009 (Directive 2009/28/EC). 
33
 For a critique of EU biofuel policy see Franco et al ‘Assumptions in the European Union Biofuel’s 
Policy: Frictions with Experiences in Germany, Brazil and Mozambique’ (2010) 37:4 Journal of 
Peasant Studies 661.  
34
 Anseeuw et al op cit note 21 at 24. 
35
 See S Kay & J Franco ‘The Global Water Grab: A Primer’ (Mar, 2012) Transnational Institute (TNI). 
36
 Von Braun & Meinzen-Dick op cit note 28 at 1. 
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environmental ends’.
37
 Green grabbing can be seen as one of the consequences of 
initiatives such as the UN backed carbon trading and sequestration schemes for 
industrialised countries, which provide incentives for acquiring land overseas for 
conservation and biochar production.
38
 Such schemes are expected to play an 
increasing role in the North’s efforts to combat rising CO
2
 emissions because it allows 
governments to play a part in reducing global CO
2
 without having to take the 





(iii)  Global economic liberalisation 
The increasing mobility and role of capital in development has put additional 
commercial pressures on land by making it more available to foreign acquisition. The 
global financial and trade liberalisation that has proceeded since the 1980s has 
accelerated economic globalisation and – particularly after the financial crisis and 
global recession of 2008 – stimulated a global drive for new, profitable sources of 
investment. The structural adjustment programmes promoted and enforced by 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank have made it easier for 
foreigners to invest in developing countries, including through TLA. As well as 
increasing access for productive investment, hedge and other investment funds have 
also been able to take advantage of the liberalisation of foreign land markets by 
acquiring land for the purposes of speculation.
40
 The World Bank has also placed great 
emphasis on increasing foreign investment in agriculture as a means of stimulating a 
sector that has remained stagnant in Africa for many years.
41
 Moreover, many African 
countries are in much need of export income and foreign currency to pay for debts and 
imports, and have been willing to sell or lease their land in order to get it.
42
 As a result, 
law reforms have been adopted across the continent in order to attract foreign 
investment. These include offering tax incentives and removing or easing entry 
                                                          
37
 J Fairhead et al ‘Green Grabbing: a new appropriation of nature?’ (2012) 39:2 Journal of Peasant 
Studies 237. 
38
 Ibid at 238. 
39
 Franco et al 'The Global Land Grab: A primer' (Feb, 2013) Transnational Institute (TNI) 14. 
40
 Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter op cit note 15 at para 2. 
41
 World Bank op cit note 2 at XXXV. 
42
 S Sassen ‘Land grabs today: feeding the disassembling of national territory’ (2013) 10:1 
Globalizations 4. 
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requirements, including on social, labour and environmental standards.
43
 Long-term 
investor friendly liberalisation and rising demand for land have made it easier and 
more attractive than ever to acquire land overseas. 
 
(c)  Impacts of TLA on rural land users 
The benefits and burdens of TLA are often not evenly shared between investors, host 
governments, and the rural land users directly affected by land deals. International 
human rights law and many host country constitutions accord rural land users a 
number of rights that are being infringed as a result of TLA. The primary duty bearer 
under international human rights law is the state. The intricacies and formalities of 
international human rights law, and the obligations of non-state actors will be 
discussed in Chapter III. In this section the source and content of the rights impacted 
by TLA will be outlined and evidence from two case studies in Africa used to 
highlight the nature of these impacts. Though it is now generally recognised that all 
human rights are interlinked and interdependent, I will focus on the rights to land, 
housing, food, to a sustainable livelihood and environment, and cultural rights, as 
these are the human rights most affected by TLA. I will also consider the unique 
impact of TLA on women’s human rights. 
 
(i)  The rights to land and housing 
The right to own and use land is closely associated with the right to own property, 
which is considered one of the most fundamental human rights and is near universally 
accepted. It appears in article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) and is enshrined in many international and regional treaties and national 
constitutions. The right includes access to and ownership of land. At a minimum, it 
places an immediate obligation on states to provide and recognise legal title to land 
and guarantee security of tenure to all rural land users under its jurisdiction. The most 
explicit and detailed recognition of the right to land in relation to rural land users can 
be found in the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
                                                          
43
 Polack et al ‘Accountability in Africa’s land rush: what role for legal empowerment?’ (2013) 
IIED/IDRC 23. 
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Populations (henceforth the Indigenous Peoples Declaration).
44
 It includes rights 
against forced removal from land and to redress if such removal occurs,
45
 and the 
requirement that no relocation takes place without the free, prior and informed consent 




The right to land is also closely linked to the right to adequate housing, 
because without legal recognition of collective or individual land rights, the right to 
housing cannot be effectively realised.
47
 In international human rights law, everyone 
has the right to adequate housing.
48
 It is a component of the right to an adequate 
standard of living and includes, inter alia, ‘the right to protection against arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with privacy, family, home, and to legal security of tenure.’
49
 
The Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing has expressed that all states 
have an ‘immediate obligation’ to guarantee security of tenure to anyone currently 
lacking titles to home or land.
50
 The rights to property, land and housing also include 
provisions against forced eviction and displacement. According to the Special 
Rapporteur, ‘forced evictions constitute prima facie violations of a wide range of 
internationally recognized human rights and can only be carried out under exceptional 
circumstances and in full accordance with international human rights law’.
51
 Provision 
of compensation, restitution, and adequate rehabilitation must be provided in the event 
that any displacement occurs, which itself can only take place in ‘exceptional 




                                                          
44
 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Populations (13 Sep 2007) UN Doc 
A/Res/61/295. There is no universally agreed definition for the term ‘indigenous peoples’, however 
rural land users in Africa meet several of the criteria established by ILO Convention No. 169 on 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (1989), which includes anyone descending from populations who 
inhabited a geographical region that was subsequently colonised, have their status wholly or partially 
governed by their own customs, have a special relationship with their land, and who identify themselves 
as indigenous peoples. 
45
 Ibid at art 28. 
46
 Ibid at art 10. 
47
 Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate 
standard of living, Miloon Kothari (5 Feb 2007) UN Doc A/HRC/4/18 at para 29. 
48
 See the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art 11(1); the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child art. 27, para. 3; as well as the non-discrimination provisions found in article 14, 
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Case study of land and housing rights violations in Zambia
53
 
In 2010, 222 Zambian families were displaced from their land without compensation 
in order to make way for a transnational land acquisition. The land had been owned by 
a missionary church since 1906 but the title deeds allowed ‘native’ people to live and 
work on the land without disturbance, and could not be removed without the consent 
of the church administrator. When an outside investor, PrivaServe Foundation, 
expressed interest in acquiring the land for commercial purposes, the church entered 
into secret negotiations and announced plans to evict what it had now decided to call 
‘illegal settlers’. The affected families formed a committee to contest their eviction 
and put together US$320 to hire a representative (they couldn’t afford a lawyer) who 
could put their case to the district High Court. The local Chief was in favour of the 
deal and informed the representative that his Presidential contacts would ensure the 
court allowed the deal to proceed. The representative then abandoned the case and was 
not present when the court ruled in favour of the church and the investor. The families 
vacated their homes and ancestral land and received no form of compensation because 
the court agreed that they were occupying the land illegally. Among the many impacts 
this had on the families were: the loss of their farm land, grazing land, and therefore a 
large portion of their livelihoods; loss of their homes which they have had to re-build 
from scratch; the area they moved to is further away from hospitals and schools; 
overall increased poverty and food insecurity; and divided communities. 
The situation these rural land users found themselves in is not an isolated case 
in Zambia, or in other parts of Africa. The case study highlights the ease with which 
rural land users rights to land and housing can be ignored in order to make way for a 
transnational land acquisition, and the severity of the impacts that can follow. 
 
(ii)  The right to adequate food, to a sustainable livelihood and environment, and 
cultural rights impacted by TLA 
The human right to adequate food is recognised in several core human rights treaties
54
 
as well as in the constitutions of seven African states.
55
 Its most explicit recognition in 
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international human rights law is in article 11(1) of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which provides that States Parties 
must ‘recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and 
his family, including adequate food’.
56
 The Committee on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR) has elaborated on article 11(1) as requiring that everyone 
under the States Parties jurisdiction should have access to minimum essential food and 
nutrition.
57
 Drawing on the CESCR, the Special Rapporteur on the right to food has 
concluded further that the state must respect, protect and fulfil this right by refraining 
from infringing the ability of individuals or groups from feeding themselves, 
preventing others (including private actors) from encroaching on that ability, and to 
take measures to actively increase the food security of all individuals and groups under 
its care.
58
 In practice, the right to food has been associated with the rights to dignity, 
social security, and the right to life.
59
 The Special Rapporteur has also noted some of 
the human rights challenges that TLA presents rural land users from a food security 
perspective. He has stated that 
The human right to food would be violated if people depending on land for their 
livelihoods, including pastoralists, were cut off from access to land, without suitable 
alternatives; if local incomes were insufficient to compensate for the price effects 
resulting from the shift towards the production of food for exports; or if the revenues 
of local smallholders were to fall following the arrival on domestic markets of 
cheaply priced food, produced on the more competitive large-scale plantations 
developed thanks to the arrival of the investor.
60
 
As the Special Rapporteur makes clear, the rights to food and land are closely linked 
to the rights to a sustainable livelihood and environment. The notion of sustainability 
requires that development related activities such as TLA ‘meet the needs of the present 
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without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.’
61
 The 
right to a sustainable livelihood can be derived from a number of other human rights, 
most significantly, from the right to an adequate standard of living enshrined in article 
11(1) of the ICESCR.
62
 It is associated with the right to land because seventy-five 
percent of the world’s poor live in rural areas and are dependent on farmland for their 
sustenance and livelihoods.
63
 Displacement or denial of access to land has negative 
impacts on the livelihoods of present generations, as well as on future generations 
ability to enjoy their own secure livelihoods.  
 The right to a sustainable environment is enshrined in article 24 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights
64
 and article 29(1) of the Indigenous Peoples 
Declaration, and is at the centre of the 1993 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development. It is impacted in a number of ways by TLA, such as when the genetic 
resources of local land are undermined by monocultures and the use of pesticides; 
when forests are cleared to make way for TLA; and when water is taken away from 
local communities in order to irrigate acquired land.
65
 There are many examples of 
TLA contracts which require that ‘all the lease’s irrigation needs be met before any 
others are taken care of.’
66
 In the Niger Delta, TLA have diverted thirty percent of the 
water that flows to the wetlands populated by 1.4 million people, exacerbating the 
effects of recent draughts and contributing to mass migration from the area.
67
 
 Cultural rights, enshrined in article 1 of the ICESCR, article 22 of the African 
Charter, and throughout the Indigenous Peoples Declaration, are also impacted by 
TLA when ways of living are disturbed. Land taken away often has many nonmaterial 
values for rural people, playing a role, for example, in religious and cultural belief 
systems.
68
 TLA are also creating new or exacerbating latent historical, ethnic or 
political conflicts over access to and control over land. Communities are not 
homogenous entities and individuals and families have differing levels of relative 
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power, wealth, and land requirements, and are therefore likely to be divided in their 
response to foreign interest in their land. Some may stand to benefit while others fear 
they will be marginalised; some may be thrown off their land while others are given 
contracts with the investor on the project; some may be willing to sell their land, 
others may not. For example, in Ghana, a TLA led to a renewal of conflict between 
local farmers and their traditional council, who they suspected had profited from 
giving away their land in the past.
69
 In Senegal, a rural meeting organised by a local 
council about a proposed TLA resulted in a 23 for, 21 against vote.
70
 In many cases, 
protests against TLA have also resulted in violence being meted out against villagers. 




Case study highlighting the impact of TLA on food security, livelihoods, 
environmental, and cultural rights in Sierra Leone
72
  
It is estimated that more than a fifth of Sierra Leone’s arable land has been leased – 
mostly to foreign companies – since 2009. The majority of the acquired land is used 
for growing oil palm, sugarcane and rice for export. Sierra Leone emerged from civil 
war only a decade ago and still ranks near the bottom of the United Nation’s Human 
Development Index, with already high levels of food insecurity and fragile 
governance. The majority of the population are small-scale farmers dependent on land 
and rain-fed agriculture for their sustenance, livelihoods and well-being. 
A study commissioned by Action for Large-scale Land Acquisition Transparency 
(ALLAT) looked at the social and economic impact of three TLA: 
 Addax Bioenergy Ltd, which acquired 44,000 ha of land to export sugarcane; 
 Sierra Leone Agriculture Ltd, which acquired 42,000 ha of land to export oil 
palm; 
 Socfin Agricultural Company Ltd, which acquired 6,500 ha of land to export 
oil palm. 
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Small farms are extremely diverse in Sierra Leone in terms of both the crops they 
produce and the types of land used for production. Most smallholders depend on this 
diversity for their nutrition and for food security in case of the failure of one or more 
crops. However, the study found that the three components of the farming system that 
smallholders rely on most – upland farms, fallow bush, and tree-crop plantations – are 
those being targeted and cleared by foreign investors in order to make way for 
industrial monoculture plantations. The resulting decrease and denial of access to a full 
range of crops has had negative impacts on food and nutritional security. The study 
found ‘increased levels of poverty, poorer and fewer meals eaten each day … [and] 
cultural dislocation and a breakdown of traditional social structures, such as male, 
female, mixed and youth farming and savings groups that contributed to social 
cohesion and community welfare.’ The study concluded that many of the affected 
communities were now ‘struggling to purchase food or even going without the food 
they once produced for themselves’ as a result of the loss of the lands to foreign 
investors. 
 
(iii)  Women’s human rights 
Though women are responsible for the majority of agricultural production in Africa, 
they face ‘systemic gender discrimination in terms of their access to, ownership of and 
control of land and the income that arises from its productive use.’
73
 Women’s human 
rights tend to be negatively impacted even more than their male counterparts because 
of the systemic discrimination they already face; their relative poverty; and their 
relative lack of power in public fora.
74
 Women can face ‘double’ and ‘triple‘ 
discriminations as a result of their subordinate status in traditional society. For 
example, women are less likely to have legal tenure over land, which is usually held 
by men. Women are also typically under-represented in traditional justice institutions. 
This double discrimination makes it harder for women both to dispute land claims, and 
to claim compensation and redress for grievances related to land.
75
 Where gender-
progressive laws and regulations have been put in place in some African countries, 
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protection of women’s rights, particularly in rural areas, remains ‘constrained by 
entrenched cultural practices, lack of legal awareness, limited access to courts, and 
lack of resources.’
76
 Dispossession resulting from TLA has often been a violent 
process, with women suffering most, including being raped, murdered and tortured in 




Though the exact scale of the global land rush is hard to determine, it is now clear that 
transnational land acquisitions are on the rise and that large swathes of African land 
have been transferred to foreign investors over the past decade, as noted above. TLA 
are having many negative impacts on rural land users, including threatening food and 
livelihood security, and increasing poverty through forced displacement without 
adequate compensation or means of redress. One of the reasons this is happening is 
that the complex array of legal frameworks under which TLA take place are not 
providing adequate protection for the human rights of rural land users, a subject to 
which this thesis now turns. 
  
 
III.  OUTLINE AND ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL COMPLEXITY OF THE 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS REGULATING TRANSNATIONAL 
LAND ACQUISITIONS: A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 
Unequal power relations between rural land users, host governments, and international 
investors are causing the benefits and burdens incurred in a transnational land 
acquisition to be unevenly shared. The overarching factor that both encapsulates and 
entrenches the unlevel playing field between communities, host governments and 
international investors, is the complex arrangement of international, regional, and 
domestic legal frameworks under which TLA take place. Foreign investment in land 
can be viewed as an aspect of contemporary globalisation that has proceeded without 
effective global governance, particularly in terms of human rights protections for those 
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affected by land deals.
78
 Global governance refers to ‘the modern practice of 
governing transborder problems and to the institutions, rules, actors, and ideologies 
that govern the global political economy’.
79
 It involves attempts to find multi-lateral 
regulatory solutions to problems that are beyond the capacity of any single actor to 
manage alone. The overall regulatory environment for TLA is both fractured and 
incomplete, and the actors that influence and are involved in this regulation are many. 
In their analysis of ‘land grabbing and global governance’, Margulis et al identified 
three political tendencies to governing TLA: (i) those that seek to regulate to facilitate 
land deals; (ii) those that advocate regulation that mitigates the negative impacts of 
TLA while maximising opportunities; and (iii) those that want to regulate to prohibit 
and rollback TLA.
80
 The first tendency is exemplified in the legal frameworks for 
trade, investment, and finance that are promulgated and enforced by actors such as the 
World Trade Organisation, international arbiters of finance and investment, 
transnational business lobbies, private actors that self-regulate transnational financial 
transactions and economic flows, and regional actors and host governments that seek 
to facilitate or attract foreign investment in farmland. The second tendency includes 
multi-lateral and hybrid initiatives to regulate TLA, involving International Finance 
Institutions, United Nations agencies, governments, as well as international and 
regional human rights responses to TLA. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and 
Company Commitment Mechanisms (CCM) that investors can sign up to and which 
aim to prevent negative human rights impacts arising from transnational business 
activities also fall into this category.  
The third category encompasses efforts mainly by transnational and local 
NGOs and rural social movements that are opposed to TLA taking place at all. These 
organisations have thus far tended to involve themselves in non-legal strategies such 
as advocacy, research, campaigning, monitoring and reporting on the human rights and 
other impacts of TLA. This third approach – based upon the prohibition or rolling-
back of land deals – has thus far failed to influence the current or emerging legal 
frameworks for TLA. 
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The first two approaches apply to the bulk of the legal regulation applicable to 
TLA. What should be kept in mind, however, is that although there are multiple layers 
of global governance that affect TLA, foreign investment in land is for the most part 
governed by international trade and investment treaties and local domestic law, both of 
which tend to prioritise industrial and investment interests over human rights 
protections. The overall way in which international investment and land governance 
has evolved in recent decades has facilitated – but been slow to respond to – the 
extensive revalorizations of land taking place. The legal frameworks put power into 
the hands of investors, eschew the rights of rural land users, and help to put cash-
strapped and incapacitated governments on the side of investors more so than their 
people. To make matters worse, the human rights approaches and instruments relevant 
to TLA are largely inaccessible, non-functioning, and unenforceable.  
This chapter will evaluate the shortcomings of the global, regional and 
domestic governance of TLA from a human rights perspective. First, the international 
trade and investment legal frameworks will be considered, followed by an analysis of 
the voluntary regulatory initiatives applicable to foreign investors in agriculture. The 
domestic governance of TLA will then be considered, before the potential of 
international and regional human rights law to respond to the human rights challenges 
of TLA is evaluated. Chapter IV will then evaluate the four main international 
regulatory responses to the legal complexity and human rights impacts of TLA. 
 
(a)  International trade and investment law 
(i)  International trade law 
The purpose of international trade and investment law is to promote, protect and 
facilitate predictable flows of transnational investment and trade. Following on from 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) is now responsible for most international trade (and some investment) law, 
which is negotiated between 159 member states and is fully legally binding and 
enforceable. Disagreements over trade and trade policy are arbitrated by the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism (though most are settled ‘out of court’) and countries 
found to be flouting the rules can receive serious penalties, including economic 
sanctions, the removal of trade preferences, the payment of compensation, or 
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expulsion from the organisation.
81
 The concerns of poorer nations have long been 
neglected at the WTO. As a member driven organisation, more powerful countries are 
in a stronger position to negotiate agreements, which is exemplified in the long-term 
trend to reduce barriers to trade in products where industrialised countries have a 
comparative advantage, while little has been done to reduce European and American 
agricultural subsidies that undermine developing countries comparative advantage in 
agriculture. More financially powerful countries are also better placed to settle 
disputes, which has a deterrent effect on challenges from poorer countries. Despite 
these asymmetries, the ‘most-favoured nation’ principle that guides all WTO rules 
ensures that all countries benefit from all tariff reductions and other trade facilitating 
deals agreed between member states: each member of the WTO must be the most-
favoured nation in terms of trade preferences, which helps to reduce trade 
discrimination and generally makes it better for a country (rich or poor) to be a part of 
the club than to try to trade outside it. The second main principle of the WTO is the 
‘single undertaking’, which provides that in order to become a member of the WTO a 
country must commit to implement the full range of WTO rules and agreements: it 
cannot ‘pick and choose’ those which it likes best. The majority of African states are 
thus bound by the full range of WTO treaties, while some qualify for varying degrees 
of trade flexibility, such as extended periods for the implementation of WTO 
commitments, due to their low-income status. In total forty-four African countries are 




 The first attempt to include the concerns of human rights and environmental 
groups in international trade law came in the ‘coherence principle’ adopted at the 1994 
Marrakesh Agreement that established the WTO. The coherence principle requires 
international trade law to be coherent with environmental sustainability and 
international human rights law. In practice, however, this is rarely the case.
83
 The main 
reason for this is that in-depth assessments of trade impacts on human rights and the 
environment are not compulsory for either trading partner, and when carried out, are 
done so inadequately or as an exercise designed to ‘rubber stamp’ an already agreed 
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trade deal.
84
 In general, liberal reforms to trade and investment have been instituted in 
developing countries before appropriate domestic safeguard policies, such as macro-
economic plans to absorb labour threatened by shifts in trade, have been put in place.
85
 
This is true of the 1995 WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), which is the main 
international legal framework for trade in agricultural goods. The AoA requires 
countries to liberalise their agricultural sectors as a means, inter alia, to increase trade 
in agricultural commodities. The AoA is not, however, a human rights document. For 
example, the AoA does not include measures to ensure that increased food exports by 
a low-income country do not threaten domestic food security.
86
 The AoA also has no 
requirement for trade and investment in agricultural assets to follow transparent and 
inclusive negotiation procedures. 
 The second attempt at incorporating human rights into international trade law 
was instituted in 2001 in what was called the ‘Doha Development Round’ of trade 
talks. High on the agenda at Doha were improvements in the AoA for developing 
countries. However, differences in opinion between developed and developing 
countries on how to strike a better balance between trade, the environment, human 
rights and other development issues has meant that, thirteen years on, the round has 
yet to be concluded. The failure of states to reach a conclusion at Doha has led to a 
surge in bi-lateral and regional trade agreements, which swing the balance of power 
further away from low-income countries, because they are now outside the formal 
equality of the WTO. This means that they are dealing directly with trade partners, 
such as the European Union, the United States or China, who represent many of the 
world’s major international investors, and who can use their influence to dictate trade 
and investment terms in their favour. 
The overall ‘institutional bias’ of the WTO means that promotion of trade and 
the protection of investments, capital and business property is central to all of its rules 
and agreements. The marginalisation of rural land users in the grand schema of 
transnational trade means that their concerns are largely absent from WTO 
agreements. Thus, while protection of investor property receives much attention in 
WTO agreements, there is no similar legal framework to protect rural land rights. In 
general, international trade law imposes few obligations on private investors, while 
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encouraging member states to adopt policies aimed at facilitating and encouraging 
trade and investment irrespective of the human rights impact that these policies might 
produce. 
 
(ii)  International investment law 
An open trade policy can have a significant impact on inward investment flows. 
Likewise, an unsustainable trade regime that eschews human rights considerations will 
promote an irresponsible investment climate.
87
 Like trade law, international 
investment law has an institutional and ideological bias towards the investor. It exists 
to facilitate and protect transnational investments against the risks related to arbitrary 
and unjustifiable action by the host state, and takes the form of binding agreements in 




International Investment Agreements (IIA) provide the main legal framework 
for the regulation of transnational investments. They usually require governments to 
treat investment in a ‘fair and equitable’ manner, which excludes discrimination in 
preference of local business and requires compensation for direct or indirect 
expropriation of assets.
89
 Investment contracts determine whether, in the event of a 
dispute, international investment arbiters such as the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes or domestic mechanisms are responsible for 
resolution. The former is usually the case, which means that investment contracts and 
international investment law can overrule the national laws of host states.
90
 Disputes 
brought to international arbiters can result in legally binding decisions imposed 
through international enforcement mechanisms.
91
 This acts as an effective deterrent 
against ‘unfair’ behaviour by the state towards investors. Moreover, in an era where 
increasing foreign direct investment has been almost universally incorporated into 
low-income countries development strategies, governments do not want to be seen to 
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be doing anything that might damage their credibility or desirability to international 
financial markets, and are thus generally disposed to seek and maintain good relations 
with investors. 
To further increase protection for investments, investment contracts also 
increasingly include ‘stabilization clauses’, which either preclude or require 
compensation for the adoption of new regulatory measures that might affect the 
investment. This remains the case even if government can show that these measures 
are in the public interest, such as to protect human rights.
92
 For example, local 
government might find that a TLA is drawing too much water away from local 
communities, causing them to struggle to irrigate their crops. It may recommend to the 
central government that the water allocation for the TLA needs to be revised. 
However, international investment treaties might consider this an act of expropriation 
or opportunism, which would allow the company involved to demand compensation 
for losses. The legal weight of stabilization clauses and the very threat of company 
action thus acts as a further deterrent against cash-poor governments acting in the 
public interest.
93
 Moreover, there is no general practice in international investment law 
that imposes duties on investors to ‘do no harm’ in the places where they invest.
94
 
Neither are there any requirements for investors to consider the social consequences of 
their investments. The duty to avoid harm and respect human rights is placed on the 
government, but the pressure governments are under to attract and not to interfere with 
investment can cause them to neglect this duty.  
On the whole, international trade and investment law offer strong protections 
against risk for investors but do not take into account the risks that investment can 
pose to the land, food and other rights of rural land users. IIAs tend to be either 
‘neutral’
95
 in terms of their position on state regulation in favour of livelihoods or 
human rights, which leaves open the possibility for the company to sue against such 
actions, or include stabilization clauses that preclude such action in the first place. 
Like WTO trade law, there are no requirements for the negotiation of investments to 
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be conducted in a participatory or transparent manner, in fact, investor confidentiality 
is often highly valued and the international financial industry is notoriously opaque. 
The end result is contracts and agreements between governments and investors that 
offer strong protection for investments but which often fail to take account of the 
needs of rural land users.  
 
(b)  Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives and Company Commitment 
Mechanisms (CCM) to respect human rights  
There are a number of global rule-making projects that offer forms of soft-regulation 
and standard setting for transnational business and investment with varying degrees of 
relevance for foreign investment in land. Though not legally binding, they form an 
important part of the global governance complex applicable to TLA, and offer 
opportunities to counter the lack of human rights protections in international trade and 
investment law. They are multi-lateral in nature, involving different configurations of 
partnerships between private enterprise, civil society actors, governments and 
international agencies. Their general aim is to improve corporate accountability for the 
social impacts incurred in transnational business operations by getting companies and 
investors to adhere to human rights and other standards, and by providing some 
recourse where human rights violations occur. The European Commission has defined 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) as: 
a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in 
their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders over 




As the European Commission definition notes, CSR measures and commitments are 
undertaken by businesses voluntarily, which has three major implications. The first is 
that there are no means in CSR mechanisms by which to force businesses to comply 
with human rights standards. The second is that businesses must see a self-interest in 
signing up to CSR. The third is that those companies that do sign up can also withdraw 
their cooperation if they later decide that CSR is no longer in their interest. The 
importance of these implications will become clearer as individual CSR and company-
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commitment mechanisms (CCM) are evaluated. The main incentive for companies to 
opt in to CSR is brand valuation. Some enterprises place a high value on avoiding loss 
of brand reputation and therefore see CSR as a means both to enhance their brand and 
to mitigate against the risks that irresponsible practices could pose to it. Such 
enterprises can be sensitive to pressure from consumers, civil society and 




(i)  Corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives 
Three examples of general CSR schemes that cover all types of multi-national 





 and the UN Global Compact.
100 
The OECD Guidelines 
apply to MNEs from the thirty-four OECD member countries, plus ten additional 
countries that have agreed to sign up. They are promoted by the governments of those 
countries and provide ‘voluntary principles and standards for responsible business 
conduct’ in areas including human rights.
101 
Each adhering government must set up a 
National Contact Point (NCP) whose role is to ‘ further the effectiveness of the 
Guidelines by undertaking promotional activities, handling enquiries, and contributing 
to the resolution of issues that arise from the alleged non-observance of the guidelines 
in specific instances.’
102
 However, the NCPs provide a rather weak enforcement 
mechanism. This is because there is no effective compliance verification procedure 
that they regularly undertake, and there are no established consequences for non-
compliance with the Guidelines. As a result, companies are under little pressure to 
comply and individual allegations against an OECD MNE can at best result in a ‘final 
statement’ by the NCP that holds no binding force. For example, Oxfam Canada 
brought a complaint against First Quantum Mining Company alleging its direct 
involvement in forced evictions in Zambia. Negotiation mediated by the NCP resulted 
in an agreement between the parties. Subsequently, however, the company breached 
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 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) aims to improve transparency in foreign 
business dealings and standardise company disclosure and reporting on the economic, 
environmental and social impacts attributable to company activities.
104
 The GRI has 
no enforcement mechanism and should be seen as an attempt to promote and 
encourage – rather than enforce – a more responsible and transparent transnational 
business environment. 
 The UN Global Compact, initiated in 2000, consists of ten ‘universally 
accepted’ principles on human rights, labour, the environment and anti-corruption that 
any company can commit to observing in its business operations. It is the basis of the 
UN’s wider efforts to create more collaborative partnerships between business, 
governments, civil society, labour, and international agencies. To date 10,000 
companies and other stakeholders have signed the Compact from over 130 
countries.
105
 It’s relevance to rural land users affected by TLA is limited however by 
the fact that the principles are extremely vague and contain nothing specific on land, 
food or other rights affected by TLA. There is little monitoring of compliance with the 
Compact beyond annual ‘Communication on Progress’ reports which companies 
complete themselves without UN or other oversight. Failure to submit a report, or the 





(ii)  Company commitment mechanisms (CCM) 
While CSR initiatives tend to be vague and broad in their content and scope, company 
commitment mechanisms (CCM) are usually more specific, and are often designed 
with a specific commodity in mind. As the name suggests, company’s can commit to 
implementing them and are usually provided with some form of certification for doing 
so. This certification is then used by the company to show to its consumers that it has 
adhered to the standards required of the scheme, thereby enhancing its brand image 
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and adding value to its products. The two CCMs most relevant to TLA are the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC) and the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). 
Around thirteen percent of TLA are for the purposes of forestry
107
 which gives the 
FSC scheme some scope to influence how these land deals are conducted. 
Unfortunately there is almost no FSC certification taking place in Africa at the present 
time.
108
 This is partly because demand for FSC certified wood from Africa is very low, 
few governments in Africa are actively supporting the scheme, and because of the 
extra costs that FSC certification puts on African forestry companies.
109
 There is no 
way to legally enforce the use of FSC certified products, so until consumers and 
procurers of wood from Africa increase their demand for FSC certification, there is 
little incentive for producers to commit to the scheme.
110
 
 A significant proportion of the land being acquired in Africa is for the purposes 
of producing palm oil for export. For example, in 2009 China acquired 2.8 million ha 
of land in the Democratic Republic of Congo to create the world’s largest oil palm 
plantation.
111
 The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO)
112
 is an international 
multi-stakeholder certification scheme designed to ensure that palm oil producers 
adhere to human rights and other standards in their operations. The RSPO requires 
producers to consider their impact on food and land rights and has been successful in 
attracting some major palm oil producers to sign up. It includes a grievance 
mechanism that has been successfully used in the context of a TLA in Liberia. Here 
the company involved agreed to hold dialogue mediated by an international NGO with 
a community whose land it had encroached upon, and to halt its operations whilst 
negotiations took place.
113
 It is difficult, however, to assess the long-term impact of 
this relatively recent initiative (it was inaugurated in 2004). There are other examples 
of its grievance mechanism failing to have any effect on companies accused of human 
rights violations. In 2012 an RSPO producer that had acquired land in Cameroon was 
accused by a local community of infringing their right to food. However, when the 
company learned that the community was filing a complaint using the RSPO grievance 
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mechanism, it withdrew its membership from the RSPO.
114
 This incident highlights 
the major flaw that is inherent in all certification schemes which rely on voluntary 
commitment from companies. 
 
(iii)  Financial sector-specific instruments 
A complex array of hedge funds, private equity funds, pension funds, banks, state-
investors, insurance companies and other kinds of financial sector organisations are 
investing, directly or indirectly, in TLA. In recent decades the UN has spearheaded a 
number of international finance sector-specific regulatory initiatives. The United 
Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative was founded in 1992 with the aim 
of creating a global partnership between the UN and the financial sector.
115
 It works 
with 200 financial institutions but is more of a platform for engagement and 
cooperation with the financial sector on UN objectives than a regulatory framework. It 
has thus far not come up with any agreements on land governance and has had little 
impact on the opacity of the financial sector. It is run mainly by financial organisations 
themselves, with relatively little UN oversight, and with only 200 organisations 
involved, has very little market coverage. 
 The UN Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI) agreed between the 
UN, civil society organisations and financial sector representatives in 2006, is the most 
widely adopted financial sector-specific regulatory initiative, having been signed by 
over 1,200 international investors with responsibility for more than US$34 trillion of 
assets, covering fifteen percent of the total global capital market.
116
 The Principles 




The UNPRI is an impressive attempt to encourage the financial industry to pay 
better attention to the social and environmental impacts of its investments. The wide 
acceptance it has gained within the industry has arguably shifted perceptions on 
acceptable norms, particularly for institutional and listed investors, in such a way as to 
make it less acceptable for investors to ignore environmental and social concerns. 
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However, as a soft-law regulatory tool the Principles suffer major shortcomings. The 
qualifying clause in the statement of commitment – ‘where consistent with our 
fiduciary responsibilities’ – suggests that human rights and environmental 
considerations come after fiduciary matters in investors hierarchy of responsibilities. 
This clause potentially allows poor performing signatories to cite their fiduciary 
responsibilities as a valid excuse for not taking action on human rights. Compliance 
with the Principles is undertaken through a survey completed by investors themselves 
and there is no mechanism to verify reports or to hold investors that fail to apply the 
principles to account. Moreover, in 2011 less than half of the signatories completed 
the reporting survey.
118
 There are no minimum entry requirements, so any investor 
with any track record in promoting – or failing to promote – human rights can sign up. 
The Principles contain nothing on land or food rights and therefore their direct impact 
on TLA is hard to assess. 
Less than a decade old, the UNPRI have become a useful standard bearer for 
the international investment industry relatively quickly, but it is too early to say 
whether it will result in long-term improvements for poor people affected by 
transnational investments, and even harder to say what affect they will have on people 
affected by TLA. 
 The Equator Principles (EPs), adopted in 2003 and substantially revised in 
2006, apply to financial service providers involved in project-related financing, 
advisory and other services (i.e. financing for development projects, broadly speaking, 
often through ‘non-recourse loans’ which must be repaid from the revenues generated 
by the project
119
). The EPs are a risk management framework designed to provide a 
minimum standard of due diligence in assessing and managing environmental and 
social risks associated with investment projects.
120
 There are currently 79 Equator 
Principles Financing Institutions (EPFI) representing 35 countries and covering a large 
portion – 70 percent – of international project finance related loans to developing 
countries.
121
 EP assessments place projects into a sliding scale of three categories 
based on their potential social and environmental risks, with each category requiring 
different sets of conditions designed to mitigate these risks to be applied to the loan. 
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 The EP have some major weaknesses that limit their potential impact on the 
human rights impacts of TLA. Project finance covers less than five percent of all 
capital investments worldwide and most TLA are not financed through this kind of 
investment.
122
 Only five African banks have signed up to the EPs, most of whose 
signatories come from OECD countries. Crucially, finance for projects with the 
potential for significant adverse social impacts can still be approved under the EPs as 
long as an ‘action plan’ is put in place to mitigate these impacts, and a third party 
mediated free, prior and informed consultation with affected communities takes place. 
The EPs are therefore not designed to eliminate the human rights impacts of 
investments but to reduce them, yet there is no mechanism to actually guarantee that 
they are significantly reduced.
123
 Moreover, communities must only be ‘consulted’ by 
project managers, it is not a necessary condition that communities actually give their 
consent, thus leaving room for projects to go ahead that are not supported by local 
people, and all the potential for conflicts that this entails. Indeed, evidence suggests 
that lack of effective independent oversight of EPs implementation has meant that 
many projects financed under the EPs have gone ahead without any consultation with 
communities taking place at all.
124
 Borrowers facing high risks also have to provide 
access to a transparent grievance mechanism, however, no systematic research has 




The CSR and CCM initiatives discussed here may be beginning to create an enabling 
environment for more responsible investment practices, and as soft-law frameworks 
they may represent the initial phase of regulatory momentum that could in the future 
result in some form of binding treaty or regulation for responsible investment. 
However, at present this seems a rather distant likelihood, and the potential positive 
impact of the current instruments to safeguard people’s land, food and other rights is 
subject to serious limitations.
126
 
In the absence of hard law or enforcement mechanisms, investors can continue 
to eschew human rights where they operate, without much risk of recourse. The 
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voluntary nature of the initiatives means that ‘free riders’ can ignore them if they 
choose. Very weak compliance, oversight and verification mechanisms are often 
combined with poor access to effective remedies. For example, there are no 
consequences for companies shown to have breached OECD Guidelines, and no 
means of enforcing redress.
127
 Most investors are primarily concerned with the 
‘bottom line’ profit to be gained from their endeavours, and without hard law forcing 
them to do so, will continue putting (often short-term) profit incentives before other 
considerations. Self-interest, often related to brand management, remains the greatest 
incentive for businesses to commit to CSR and CCM, but many view the costs in time 
and money associated with signing up to voluntary regulation as a burden they can do 
without.
128
 Enhancing buyers markets for certified products is one way to put more 
pressure on companies to adhere to certification schemes, which on the whole offer the 
most protection for food and land rights. Governments in both developed and 
developing nations can encourage this through legislation, tax and other incentives, 
and through their own procurement policies. However this is a long process that is also 
reliant on consumer demand for socially responsible products, which at present 
remains relatively low and heavily restricted to OECD consumer markets. Most of the 
signatories to CSR and CCM initiatives are also from OECD countries, which means 
that the vast majority of international investors, especially those with dramatically 
increasing portfolios from the emerging markets, continue to operate outside of these 
frameworks. Even within the OECD, very little of the total market has signed up. 
Across the world, the financial industry is infamous for its opacity. The evidence that 
finance sector-specific soft instruments are having any impact on transparency is 
minimal, and even less in terms of positive impacts on the ground for vulnerable 
people affected by investment activity.  
CSR and CCM initiatives are generally in early stages of development and 
their long-term impacts on the human rights of populations affected by transnational 
business and investment is hard to judge at this stage. There are many opportunities 
for improvement and for increasing the scope of these initiatives, particularly beyond 
the OECD market. However, the key shortcomings outlined above mean that these 
soft-regulatory frameworks may not be the solution to the current difficulties that TLA 
are posing to rural land users. 
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(c)  Domestic legal frameworks 
For TLA to produce benefits for local land users as well as foreign investors, an 
appropriate institutional framework in the host state must be in place. With fifty-three 
governments of various political stripes, Africa is home to a diverse array of land 
governance frameworks and rights regimes, including private, public, community and 
customary land ownership arrangements. It also has a wide range of legal frameworks 
applicable to TLA, although the boundaries for national trade and investment policy 
are to a large extent shaped by international trade and investment treaties. This is 
particularly the case in terms of what protective policy measures, including in relation 
to land and other human rights, governments are able to take in relation to 
investments.
129
 Indeed, in recent years many governments have adopted investor 
friendly law reforms that include the easing of social and environmental standards 
required for acceptable or responsible investment.
130
 As the case studies in chapter II 
illustrated, governments under pressure to attract foreign investment in land have 
shown a willingness to do so at the expense of the land and other rights of rural 
communities.  
 Margulis et al have identified five key areas where the typical African state 
exerts control over foreign investment in land: (i) ‘invention/justification’ of the need 
for large-scale land investments; (ii) ‘definition, reclassification and quantification’ of 
what is ‘marginal, under-utilized and empty’ lands; (iii) ‘identification’ of these 
particular types of land; (iv) ‘acquisition/appropriation’ of these lands; and (v) 
‘reallocation/disposition’ of these lands to investors.
131
 Important to note here is the 
fact that, following on from their colonial antecedents, land in Africa remains largely 
under the control of central governments, who are thus the main role-players in 
making land available to private investors and in negotiating land deals. In some 
countries, such as Ethiopia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, land is almost fully 
nationalised.
132
 However, weak land governance as a result of a lack of capacity, poor 
land legislation, and little access to justice for rural communities, undermines central 
government’s ability to ensure that rural land users are not marginalised by land deals. 
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Many central governments in Africa do not have the capacity to collect 
information on and effectively manage the vast swathes of land under their control. As 
a result, governments often fall into the trap of making what they see as ‘marginal’ or 
‘unused’ land available for investors without full knowledge of its boundaries, whether 
it is already being used, and who lives on it.
133
  
This lack of capacity also makes it difficult for central governments to enforce 
land legislation, which itself is often weak in terms of recognition of rural land rights. 
Many rural communities use land under customary tenure arrangements that lack 
statutory legal recognition. This can be attractive to investors, who may find it easier 
to acquire land in a country without effective legal protection for the land used and 
occupied by rural communities. For some, this explains why two-thirds of the reported 
land grabs have been in Africa, where around 700 million people live on land that is 
customarily owned but has insecure tenure under national law.’
134
 While a foreign 
investor’s entitlement to land under its contract may be easily enforced, the local 
farmers that used the land previously may struggle to claim the rights that attach to 
their customary ownership if such ownership isn’t recognised by the state. In 
Tanzania, for example, only 850 out of around 14,000 villages have a certificate for 
their land under law, while in Uganda no communities have secured collective titles.
135
 
Lack of recognition of customary land rights can mean that it is ‘perfectly legal for a 
government to allocate land to a company with minimal consultation and transparency, 
and with paltry compensation payments for local groups.’
136
 Where private or 
customary land ownership is recognised, inaccessible land registration procedures 
ensure that most land remains unregistered and thus defaults to the control of the 
state.
137
 As a result, local communities control over their land can become extremely 
fragile when it becomes of interest to foreign investors.  
Where land is not held by the state, traditional authorities such as local Chiefs 
often have ultimate decision-making power for land allocations. Evidence suggests 
that traditional authorities can be coerced into giving away land by the application of 
political, financial or other pressure. Case studies from Ghana, where Chiefs are the 
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first port of call for investors looking for land, have found that ‘[m]any chiefs have 
engaged in appropriating lands for personal use, and in renting or even selling it to 
outsiders for personal gain.’
138
 
Local rural people’s rights to their land can also be undermined by the legal 
requirement that the land user is able to demonstrate ‘productive use’ of the land, 
which may be difficult to do, particularly in the case of fallow, forest, or grazing 
lands.
139
 The legal concept of ‘public purpose’ is also widely employed to expropriate 
privately and customarily held land rights for projects deemed to be in the public 
interest, which can include TLA.
140
  
Moreover, much of the current land and investment legislation in Africa does 
not require social impact assessments (SIA) to be carried out when land is transferred 
to foreign investors. Where SIA are required, the law tends to lack clarity over the 
standards that must be met, the independence of the assessor, public access to 
information requirements, and the extent to which project implementation is 
dependent on a successful SIA, and to what extent investors are liable for mitigation 
plans.
141
 A number of case studies demonstrate that, where SIA are required, TLA 
have gone ahead without the assessment ever taking place.
142
 
Where land has been ‘grabbed’ and local land users dispossessed, access to 
justice is rarely available for rural land users. There is a widespread lack of legal 
awareness among rural communities, a lack of resources required for litigation, 
deference towards local and national authority, and a mistrust of courts and formal 
legal procedures.
143
 On the other hand, many TLA can be formerly legal acts in that 
they adhere to procedures established by applicable law. Nevertheless, they may be 
unjust or illegitimate from a human rights perspective. Unfortunately, international 
and regional human rights law has thus far failed to empower rural land users to 
protect and advance their rights against foreign investors and host governments.  
 
(d)  International human rights law 
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Chapter II discussed some of the rights that international human rights law accords to 
rural land users. These included rights to land, housing, against forced evictions, to 
food, to a sustainable livelihood and environment, to participate in and receive 
information about TLA, and for many, indigenous rights which include the right to 
FPIC for major investment projects. These rights are derived from international human 
rights treaties to which most African states are a party, as well as from international 
customary law, which includes a multitude of declarations, general principles, 
guidelines, and resolutions of various UN bodies, which also place restrictions on 
states ability to infringe the rights of their citizens. This chapter has shown that many 
governments, which are the primary duty bearer for enforcing these rights, are failing 
in their obligations when it comes to TLA. It has also shown that international trade 
and investment law places few obligations on investors to respect human rights. The 
question then arises, to what extent can international human rights instruments and 
mechanisms hold states and international investors accountable for the human rights 
impacts of TLA?  
 
(i)  UN Charter based mechanisms 
There are two groups of mechanisms through which the United Nations enforces 
international human rights law: Charter-based mechanisms and Treaty-based 
mechanisms. The former have grown out of the UN Charter and the latter are derived 
from human rights treaties agreed between states. The Human Rights Council (HRC) 
is charged with overseeing Charter-based mechanisms, the most influential of which 
are the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and various ‘special procedures’. The UPR 
reviews every UN member states compliance (whether they are parties to human rights 
treaties or not) with all internationally recognised human rights every two years. 
Unfortunately the time constraints of the review process and the large number of 
human rights under consideration at each UPR review session means that there is little 
opportunity for any in-depth focus on specific human rights violations, or clusters of 
violations.
144
 Moreover, the recommendations issued to states at the end of the UPR 
are not binding, and if states fail to implement them by the time of the next review 
session, there is little the HRC can do beyond reminding the state of its obligations. 
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 Special procedures established by the HRC provide further opportunities for 
the UN to promote human rights. They include ‘special rapporteurs’ who are 
internationally respected human rights experts with mandates from the HRC to address 
human rights issues on a thematic basis or in relation to particular human rights.
145
 
Special Rapporteurs can undertake country visits in line with their thematic mandate, 
which are followed by reports submitted to the HRC on the standard of protection 
being afforded to particular rights or groups of rights in a country. They can also 
receive individual complaints from aggrieved parties in any country without any 
requirement for the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies. However, Rapporteurs can 
only respond to such complaints by issuing ‘urgent appeals’ or ‘letters of allegation’ to 
states, which though made public, are not legally binding. On average only one in 
three reports from Special Rapporteurs elicit a response from governments.
146
 
 Special Representative to the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie (SRSG 
Ruggie), has in recent years developed the international human rights law response to 
rights violations occurring as a result of the operations of transnational businesses. 
Ruggie was mandated by the HRC to develop Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, which were unanimously endorsed by the HRC in October 2012 in 
HRC resolution 21/5. Ruggie’s contribution to the legal complexity of transnational 
business and human rights is thus worthy of some consideration, though like the UPR, 
it suffers from major shortcomings in relation to enforcement. Indeed, Ruggie notes in 
his report to the HRC that he has developed a guide and no more, and does not expect 




The Guidelines recognise the longstanding human rights law principle that 
states have obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, but emphasise that 
this includes the duty to protect citizens against potential and actual abuses of human 
rights by transnational business enterprises operating within their territories. The 
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Guidelines state that compliance with human rights law requires that states take 
‘appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress such abuse through 
effective policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication.’
148
  
Ruggie also emphasises that under international human rights law the state is 
not the only actor with responsibility for protecting and promoting human rights. The 
Guidelines detail how business enterprises and investors also have obligations arising 
from existing human rights law. These include duties to protect and respect human 
rights where they do business, and to provide access to effective remedies where rights 
are infringed as a result of their operations.
149
 These duties exist independently of the 
host states ability or willingness to fulfil its own obligations, and businesses should 
never do anything to undermine this ability or willingness.
150
 The responsibilities of 
transnational businesses include carrying out due diligence processes to identify, 
prevent, mitigate and account for the human rights impacts of their operations.
151
 At a 




 Ruggie’s guidelines are inspired by the existing provisions of the International 
Bill of Rights, other UN treaties, and the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work. The Guidelines do an excellent job at elaborating these existing 
standards and integrating them into a coherent and comprehensive HRC endorsed 
guide for transnational businesses, civil society, government and various judicial 
bodies interested in the nexus between states, transnational businesses and human 
rights.
153
 However, the Guidelines themselves do not create new law and are not 
binding upon states or businesses. They include no mechanism to enforce compliance 
or to review their implementation. Some writers have argued that in time the 
significance of the Guidelines may become more apparent. For example, Blitt draws 
on the experience of the UDHR to argue that ‘aspirational non-binding principles, or 
“soft law,” can evolve continually over time into more durable and enforceable “hard 
law” – either in the form of a written treaty or in the consolidation of customary 
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international practice.’
154
 TLA are, however, an existing phenomena affecting large 
numbers of people and thus requires more immediate attention. At this stage, the 
Guidelines do not constitute a significant challenge to the binding and well-enforced 
international trade and investment law that regulates foreign acquisitions of land. 
 
(ii)  UN Treaty based mechanisms 
The main mechanism for enforcing and reviewing states compliance with international 
human rights treaties is the state reporting procedure. States Parties to a treaty must 
submit periodic reports (usually every four years) to the relevant treaty monitoring 
body (TMB), while civil society actors can contribute to this process by submitting 
‘shadow reports’ that offer an alternative analysis of the human rights situation in the 
country. The TMB reviews these reports, meets with representatives of the state and 
civil society at a review session, and then issues ‘concluding observations’ or 
‘concluding recommendations’ to the state on how it can improve its observance with 
the treaty. The process applies scrutiny and some authoritative international pressure 
on states to comply with their human rights obligations, and provides a platform for 
government, civil society, and international monitors to debate and discuss the human 
rights situation in the country. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has called the 
treaty body system, and the state reporting procedure by which it is enforced, 'the 
indispensable link between universal standards and the individuals they were designed 
to empower and protect.’
155
 
 The state reporting procedure, does, however, have some major shortcomings. 
Many treaties have over 150 States Parties and TMBs have long lacked the capacity to 
keep up with the volume of reports they receive from governments and civil society. 
As of March 2012, a total of 281 state reports were awaiting consideration by the 
various TMBs, and the average waiting time between a state submitting its report and 
that report being reviewed by the TMB was two to four years.
156
 These delays mean 
that the information and data contained in the report is likely to be severely out of date 
by the time it is reviewed, and the prospect of any immediate human rights concerns 
being resolved is low. This also causes any momentum built up within and between 
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government and civil society in the processes leading to the submission of reports to 
be lost.  
As well as lacking the capacity to deal with the current number of reports, 
TMBs are also hamstrung in their ability to enforce treaties because in many cases – 
particularly for states who have the worst human rights records – States Parties are 
very overdue on their reporting responsibilities. In 2010 and 2011, only 16% of all 
reports that were due were submitted on time, and despite one-year grace periods 
being granted to all late states, still after this period only one third of reports had been 
submitted on time.
157
 For five out of the nine TMBs, over 20% of states parties have 
never submitted a single report, and have therefore ratified treaties but have never 
actually been reviewed for compliance. As of April 2012, a total of 626 State Party 
reports were overdue for submission to the nine TMBs.
158
 Despite report submission 
being central to the enforcement of human rights treaties, the TMBs have no 
mechanisms by which to force states to submit their reports. 
In addition to the state reporting procedure, five core treaties now have 
Optional Protocols creating Individual Communication Procedures and/or Inquiry 
Procedures.
159
 The former allow individuals or their representatives to petition a TMB 
for redress of alleged violations of a human rights treaty. The latter allows the TMB to 
inquire into and investigate grave or systemic violations of human rights in a State 
Party. There may be more scope for Individual Communications Procedures and 
Inquiry Procedures to be used in relation to TLA once the Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR comes into force.
160
 This will allow complaints to be brought to the CESCR 
on alleged violations of the rights to food, housing and livelihoods. However, there are 
two key limitations to these procedures. The first is the requirement that before 
making an individual complaint one must exhaust the internal justice system where the 
alleged grievance has occurred. This can be a vast, costly, and lengthy process which 
rural land users threatened with dispossession or other rights violations resulting from 
a TLA are unlikely to be able to afford. The time required for such processes to take 
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place alone makes utilisation of the UN system a distant option for many people 
seeking immediate relief to a human rights related grievance. Moreover, strict 
admissibility requirements have meant that most communications are never reviewed 
by the TMBs. For example, in 2009 only 110 out of 9900 communications were 
admitted for consideration by the TMBs.
161
 There are also currently no means by 
which complaints can be made against transnational businesses or investors through 
the UN charter mechanisms nor through the treaty-based mechanisms as there is no 
treaty directly related to businesses and human rights or which directly binds non-state 
actors to adhere to human rights standards. Moreover, there is little the TMBs can do 
to enforce their decisions on complaints and investigations. 
International legal efforts to prove that a TLA has violated rights to food, land, 
housing or other rights would involve a lengthy process of litigation and research at 
multiple levels. At present, all of the potential UN level mechanisms on offer suffer 
flaws that make one question whether such efforts would be worthwhile for rural land 
users. Submitting a report to the HRC through the UPR process is unlikely to yield 
many benefits as the UPR does not focus on specific rights violations and the 
recommendations issued to states are not legally enforced. Complaints could be made 
to Special Rapporteurs but their decisions are also not legally binding. SRSG Ruggie’s 
Guidelines on Business and Human Rights, while providing encouragement to 
investors to consider human rights when investing abroad and building some 
momentum in international law on the human rights obligations of transnational 
businesses, do not have a legally binding complaints mechanism or any means by 
which to review implementation. In general, the HRC mechanisms are designed to 
hold states accountable for human rights, not investors. The TMBs that enforce human 
rights treaties are over-stretched and suffer from equally weak enforcement: state 
reports are not received or reviewed on time, few individual communications are acted 
upon, and TMB decisions, though holding some weight in international law, are 
merely ‘recommendations’ that cannot be enforced on states. UN procedures for 
enforcing human rights are most effective when applied to states with open and 
democratic political and civil structures and who are genuinely concerned about their 
human rights records and their international prestige. In the absence of hard 
enforcement mechanisms, the UN struggles to advance human rights in countries 
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where publicity through civil society and the media – the UN’s most powerful tool – is 
restricted. Overall, UN human rights mechanisms are largely inaccessible to rural land 
users due to the time, resources, and financial costs associated both with engaging the 
UN system, and exhausting domestic legal remedies. As a result, there has been no use 
thus far of international human rights institutions directly related to the global land 
rush.
162
 Advances in international human rights law, particularly in relation to 
enforcement and access to remedy, have not kept the pace with the substantial 




(e)  Regional human rights law 
Development and political stability remain among the highest priorities for the African 
continent, which can be seen in the emphasis on development in the 1981 African 
Charter and in the equal recognition it accords economic, social and cultural rights 
with civil and political rights. The Charter established the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples' Rights, whose mandate is to 'promote human and peoples’ rights 
and ensure their protection in Africa'.
164
 In 1998, a Protocol to the Commission was 
signed establishing an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, which came into 
force in 2004 and has gradually become the main judicial enforcement mechanism of 
the African regional human rights system.
165
 In 2008 the Court had a new human 
rights section added to it called the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
Though these two courts are currently operating together, creating (at least 
temporarily) a confusing aspect to Africa's human rights system, the latter will replace 
the former once it receives the required number of member state ratifications. As well 
as the African Charter, the Commission and Courts can ‘draw inspiration from’ all 
other international human rights law instruments and jurisprudence,
166
 while the 
Courts may consider the obligations arising from any other human rights instruments 
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ratified by the state under review.
167
 These provisions give the judicial bodes a wide 
basis for human rights protection and interpretation. 
 The right to food is not expressly provided for in the African Charter but the 
African Commission has found it implicitly recognised in the rights to dignity, health 
and development.
168
 The 2005 Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa
169
 is a 
supplement to the Charter and provides an extra source of law for the Courts when 
adjudicating alleged violations of women’s rights. It explicitly recognises the right to 
food in article 15(a), as well as the means of producing food, which includes access to 
land. Article 14 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child provides 
that States are also obligated to ensure that children have access to adequate nutrition. 
 The right to own property is guaranteed in article 14 of the Charter, which 
allows encroachment on this right where a ‘general interest’ or ‘public need’ can be 
shown. Article 21 provides that people unlawfully dispossessed of their property have 
the right to receive adequate compensation. However, some scholars have argued that 
the public interest provisions of article 14 mean that the Charter is weaker on property 
rights than other international human rights law documents, because these articles read 
together do not explicitly require states to pay compensation in the event that the right 
to property is infringed.
170
 The right of access to adequate housing has been derived 
from the right to property in article 14 and thus also receives weaker protection than 
that accorded to it in the ICESCR and by the CESCR in General Comment No. 4, 
which guarantees legal protection against forced eviction.
171
 
 The African Women’s Protocol also provides rights to a healthy and 
sustainable environment
172
 and to sustainable development, which requires states to 
‘promote women’s access to and control over productive resources such as land and 
guarantee their right to property’.
173
 The right to sustainable development also 
includes the right of women to participate ‘at all levels in the conceptualisation, 
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 Due to the limitations of the UN human rights system outlined above, a legal 
strategy seeking recourse for human rights violations resulting from a TLA may 
consider petitioning the African Commission or the African Court of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). To date this has not occurred, although there is precedent 
within the African system for adjudicating some of the contentious issues that could 
arise out of a case involving a foreign land acquisition. In Social and Economic Rights 
Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria, the African 
Commission held that foreign companies operating in the Niger Delta region had 
caused intolerable levels of health and other damage to the Ogoni peoples due to the 
environmental degradation and pollution caused by their operations.
175
 It found that 
the Nigerian government had failed to uphold the Ogoni’s rights to property, health, 
food, livelihood, housing, and to sustainable development and a healthy 
environment.
176
 Crucially, it found that the government had given a ‘green light to 
private actors, and the oil companies in particular, to devastatingly affect the well-
being of the Ogonis’
177
 and therefore that human rights were violated in part due to the 
government’s failure to uphold its obligations to effectively monitor and regulate the 
activities of the foreign companies.
178
 The Commission ordered the government to, 
inter alia, investigate the human rights violations that had resulted from the activities 
of the oil companies; provide relief, resettlement and compensation to the victims of 
those violations; ensure that appropriate environmental and social impact assessments 
were prepared with independent oversight for any future oil development projects; and 
provide adequate information to the Ogoni peoples on the risks associated with such 
projects.
179
 The Commission stopped short of calling for the FPIC of communities 
affected by such projects and did not make any orders directly against the foreign oil 
companies. 
 In CEMIRIDE and Minority Rights Group International v Kenya the African 
Commission found that the Kenyan governments forced eviction of the Endorios – a 
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pastoral group dispossessed of their land in order to make way for a game reserve in 
1979 – had violated their rights to, inter alia, property, a cultural life, self-
determination and development.
180
 The Kenyan government had not respected the 
Endorios rights to property or secure tenure because it had denied them full title to 
their land, which allowed the government to dispossess the Endorios unlawfully and 
without compensation.
181
 The Commission also found that ‘the upheaval and 
displacement of the Endorios from the land they call home and the denial of their 
property rights over their ancestral land [was] disproportionate to any public need 
served by the Game Reserve.’
182
 This decision was, however, heavily influenced by 
the classification of the Endorios as indigenous people, which gave them extra 
protections under international law. As previously stated, it is unclear whether all rural 
land users affected by TLA would also receive this extra protection.  
These two landmark cases demonstrate the African Commission’s willingness 
to hold governments accountable for mass violations of the rights to property and land, 
food, livelihood, housing and environment. In Social and Economic Rights Action 
Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria the Commission 
emphasised that the states duty to protect human rights included duties to ensure that 
private operators do not infringe on human rights as a result of their operations, 
although, as its jurisdiction extends only to the state, the Commission was unable to 
place any order directly against the oil companies doing business in the Niger Delta. 
This case also showed that the Commission is willing to uphold the programmatic 
rights to participation and access to information for communities affected by large 
development projects. However, as a potential avenue for rural land users affected by 
TLA, the African regional human rights system may not provide an easy, quick, or 
cheap access to remedy. The first reason for this is that the decisions of the African 
Commission are non-binding. The Commission can only ‘draw attention’ to the human 
rights situation under review, submit a report stating its findings, and make 
‘recommendations’ regarding the relief governments ought to provide.
183
 The two 
Courts can issue binding judgements, however, only 26 out of 53 African states have 
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ratified the protocol establishing the ACHPR,
184
 while only three states have ratified 
the protocol establishing the ACJHR, which requires fifteen ratifications before it can 
replace the ACHPR and enter into force.
185
  
At the Commission, the process of reviewing complaints is largely secretive as 
article 59(1) of the African Charter provides that findings are kept confidential until 
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government decide to make the complaint and 
their findings public, which can take some time. More time is required on the part of 
litigants because both the African Commission and the Courts require domestic 
remedies to be exhausted before petitions can be considered, which, as previously 
stated, can prove very difficult for the rural poor. In the cases considered above, the 
communities affected received a great deal of assistance by non-governmental 
organisations who took up their cause and garnered significant international and 
regional support. Moreover the human rights violations, particularly in the case of the 
oil disasters in the Niger Delta, were well publicised in international and regional 
media, giving the Commission extra incentive to consider the case and pass an 
authoritative judgement. In any case, rural land users aggrieved by a TLA would also 
have to rely on enormous support from NGOs and other supporters to have their 
concerns supported and raised all the way through both domestic and then regional 
judicial mechanisms.  
There is also a high-level of uncertainty as to whether the Commission or the 
Courts would wish to pass judgement, and what that judgement would be, on the 
question of the developmental or public interest case for TLA. The ‘general interest’ 
and ‘public need’ provisions in article 21 of the charter on the right to property would 
likely be drawn upon by a government wishing to argue that a TLA was necessary and 
that its encroachment on the property of rural land users was therefore justified. 
Determining whether this is true would put the Commission or the Court into the 
highly contested policy terrain surrounding the role of large-scale foreign owned farm 
projects in the agricultural and rural development of African economies. This chapter 
has shown how many TLA, despite infringing on the human rights of rural land users, 
were carried out legally under applicable domestic law. It is therefore uncertain as to 
the extent to which the Commission or the Courts would be willing to both overrule 
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such law and/or to pass judgement on whether any expropriation of property was 
indeed in the ‘general interest’. 
 The African regional system for the promotion and protection of human rights 
is in something of a period of transition and its potential to have a significant impact 
on the rights of rural land users affected by TLA is unclear. Currently there is a 
Commission and two Courts empowered to enforce human rights on the continent, and 
these bodies are in the process of learning how to work together to effectively fulfil 
their separate but interlinked mandates. The Courts are meant to 'complement and 
reinforce' the functions of the African Commission, especially its protective 
mandate,
186
 which is why they are able to issue binding decisions. Yet it remains 
uncertain which kinds of cases will be dealt with by each body and what the 
relationship between them will be.
187
 For these reasons it is highly uncertain whether 
the African regional system provides a suitable avenue for petitions concerning the 
human rights impact of TLA. 
 
IV.  FOUR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE RESPONSES TO TLA: A PRELIMINARY 
ASSESSMENT 
A recent report by the International Land Coalition concluded that the drivers of the 
global land rush are likely to persist in the long-term and that an effective long-term 
regulatory response is therefore necessary, as well as urgent action to mitigate the 
short-medium term impacts of badly negotiated TLA.
188
 Central to any assessment of 
the current responses to the human rights impact of TLA is whether they significantly 
alter power relations between locals, investors and governments. Locals must be 
empowered to claim their rights and to defend and advance their interests. 
Governments and companies must be held to account to ensure that land deals are 
conceived democratically and transparently, benefit local people and contribute to 
broader development objectives. There have been four major international responses to 
the global governance gaps and legal complexity of foreign acquisitions of land. These 
are the Minimum Principles and Measures to address the human rights challenge of 
large-scale land acquisitions propounded by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
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the right to food and endorsed by the Human Rights Council; the International Finance 
Corporation’s inclusion of Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement as a 
specific category of concern in its influential and recently updated Performance 
Standards; the Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture (PRAI) jointly 
developed by the World Bank, FAO, UNCTAD and the IFAD; and the Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in 
the Context of National Food Security agreed between governments, civil society and 
international agencies and endorsed by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the 
United Nations (FAO), the Committee on World Food Security, the G20 and the UN 
General Assembly. As all of these responses are less than five years old, a preliminary 
assessment can be offered on their potential to enhance the protection and promotion 
of the human rights of communities affected by TLA. 
 
(a)  The Minimum Principles of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Food 
The first official international response to the human rights impact of TLA came from 
the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, in 2009. De Schutter 
drew up what he called ‘Minimum Principles and Measures’ to address the human 
rights challenge of large-scale land acquisitions and leases.
189
 He was alarmed that 
countries selling or leasing their most arable farmland to foreign investors ‘often have 
no development plan for food security in place and do not systematically assess any 
possible negative social impacts of specific land investments beforehand.’
190
 In his 
mandate as Special Rapporteur,
191
 De Schutter set out to ‘provide guidance to ensure 




 The Minimum Principles are based on the obligations that arise from article 11 
of the ICESCR and from General Comment No. 12 of the CESCR on the right to food. 
In particular, De Schutter draws attention to the provision that states must ‘refrain 
from infringing on the ability of individuals and groups to feed themselves where such 
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an ability exists (respect), and to prevent others – in particular private actors such as 
firms – from encroaching on that ability (protect).’
193
 He also notes that international 
finance institutions and development banks have a duty to ensure that the right to food 
is not impaired by their lending policies.
194
  
De Schutter was primarily concerned with the impact that TLA are having on 
rural peoples access to resources essential to their sustenance and livelihoods. His 
Principles focus on the procedural requirements that states and investors must follow 
in order to ensure that such peoples food security and land rights are not threatened. 
The Principles require that negotiations leading to a TLA must be conducted in a ‘fully 
transparent manner, and with the participation of local communities’ (Principle 1). 
Principle 2 requires that shifts in land can only take place with the free, prior and 
informed consent of the local communities concerned. Principle 3 requires states to 
legally recognise all land users rights to land and Principle 4 provides that investment 
agreements ensure adequate benefit sharing between communities, government and 
investors when TLA take place. Principles 5 and 6 encourage states to promote labour 
intensive and environmentally friendly farming projects. Principle 7 provides that 
investment contracts must place clear and explicit obligations on investors to respect 
human rights and Principle 8 requires TLA contracts in food-importing countries 
include a clause which ensures that a percentage of the food produced in the acquired 
land is sold to domestic markets. Principle 9 requires participatory impact assessments 
to take place which evaluate the potential impact of TLA on local incomes; access for 
locals to productive resources; protection for the environment, including soil and water 
quality; and that the availability and adequacy of local food supplies are not disrupted 
by TLA. Principle 10 reminds states of their extra obligations towards indigenous 
communities and Principle 11 requires that TLA respect the labour rights of any local 
people employed on a foreign owned farm project. 
The impact of the Minimum Principles has been mainly normative. They were 
the first official attempt to stimulated debate on the human rights challenge of TLA at 
the international level and have helped to ensure that that debate interprets TLA as a 
human rights issue. This has been the case in relation for the Voluntary Guidelines 
adopted by the FAO which are evaluated in section (d) below. As Chapter 3 
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illustrated, however, the enforcement mechanisms of the UN special procedures are 
too weak to effectively enforce the Principles. Therefore, although De Schutter 
provides an authoritative articulation of the existing human rights law norms 
applicable to TLA, the Special Rapporteur was unable to provide any new mechanism 
by which to ensure that TLA do not violate human rights. The impact of the Principles 
on the ground or in specific incidences of human rights violations occurring as a result 
of TLA is therefore limited: their influence lies in providing a human rights law basis 
and benchmark upon which stronger regulatory responses can be assessed. 
 
(b)  Performance Standards of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is the private-sector financial arm of the 
World Bank Group. It is owned by 184 member countries and provides financial 
services, from loans to advisory products, for private sector projects in more than 100 
developing countries.  Its purpose is to help ‘companies and financial institutions in 
emerging markets to create jobs, generate tax revenues, improve corporate governance 
and environmental performance, and contribute to their local communities.’
195
 The 
IFC has increased its lending to agribusiness projects from US$2.5 billion in 2002 to 
US$6-8 billion in 2012.
196
 Oxfam estimates that a significant proportion of these 
investment projects involve TLA.
197
 Through its advisory services, the World Bank 
and IFC have also been ‘helping developing country governments to make it easier for 
foreign investors to acquire land and encouraging them to offer tax holidays, thereby 
creating a fertile investment climate for land acquisitions.’
198
 
The Performance Standards (PS) are the centrepiece of the IFCs wider policy 
on environmental and social sustainability. According to the IFC, they are ‘designed to 
help clients avoid, mitigate and manage risk as a way of doing business 
sustainably.’
199
 Any client proposing an investment project that is determined to pose 
a moderate to high risk of environmental and/or social impacts must carry out that 
investment in accordance with the PS.
200
 Many state-owned banks and investment 
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agencies also benchmark their projects against the Performance Standards of the IFC. 
This includes 32 export credit agencies from the OECD, the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA, part of the World Bank Group which provides political 
risk insurance guarantees) and 15 European Development Finance Institutions. The PS 
have also been incorporated into the ‘Equator Principles’ which were discussed in the 
previous chapter. Therefore, although they are primarily designed to apply to IFC 
clients, the influence of the PS extends beyond direct IFC activities: they are 
recognised internationally as a leading benchmark for social risk management. 
There are eight Performance Standards which cover the following areas: 1. the 
assessment and management of environmental and social risks and impacts; 2. labour 
and working conditions; 3. resource efficiency and pollution prevention; 4. community 
health, safety, and security; 5. land acquisition and involuntary resettlement; 6. 
biodiversity conservation and sustainable management of living natural resources; 7. 
indigenous peoples; 8. cultural heritage.
201
 
PS1 provides that the process for investment projects must include free, prior 
and informed consultations with local communities, but falls short of requiring local 
peoples consent for the project to go ahead. This is weaker than the guidelines offered 
by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, which establish the free, prior and 
informed consent of affected communities as an international human rights norm. It 
also fails to acknowledge the legal right of indigenous communities to free, prior, and 
informed consent. 
 PS5 on ‘land acquisition and involuntary resettlement’ is a new addition to the 
most recent PS, which took effect from January 1, 2012. PS5 is concerned with 
avoiding or minimizing involuntary physical and economic displacement resulting 
from IFC project-related land acquisitions.
202
 The IFC accepts that involuntary 
resettlement as a result of ‘lawful expropriation or restrictions on land use’ may be 
‘unavoidable’.
203
 In such cases PS5 requires investors to take ‘appropriate measures to 
mitigate adverse impacts on displaced persons and host communities’.
204
 Involuntary 
displacement can have serious economic, social and cultural consequences, as Chapter 
II illustrated. The fact that PS5 fails to guarantee to rural land users that involuntary 
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displacement will not take place thus leaves room for serious human rights violations 
to occur. The influence of the PS on the wider normative framework for TLA means 
that PS5 has also helped to make involuntary displacement an acceptable practice for 
non-IFC-financed TLA. PS5 also falls short of the Special Rapporteurs Minimum 
Principles, which require states to ‘ensure that forced evictions do not take place’.
205
 
Compliance with the PS is overseen by the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman 
(CAO), which reports directly to the President of the World Bank. Complaints relating 
to any aspect of an IFC-financed business activity can be made to the CAO, which 
aims to ‘resolve complaints using a flexible problem solving approach’.
206
 In addition, 
the CAO overseas periodic audits of the IFC’s overall environmental and social 
performance.
207
 The most common response of the CAO to a complaint is to undertake 
a PS compliance audit of the project and then to advise its client on how to proceed.
208
 
 Since 2008, 21 complaints have been made to the CAO relating to land and 
other human rights violations occurring as a result of IFC-financed agricultural 
projects that involved TLA.
209
 In all cases the communities claimed that they had ‘not 




 In practice, the PS have failed to offer protection or recourse against 
involuntary displacement occurring as a result of TLA. For example, the IFC helped to 
finance a forest plantation project in Uganda proposed by UK-based New Forests 
Company (NFC). To make way for the company’s planned logging operations, 20,000 
people were forcibly evicted from their homes.
211
 Oxfam International complained to 
the CAO that the project had violated the PS and an investigation was launched. The 
CAO concluded that ‘NFC had been unable to comprehensively apply the principles 
guiding resettlement’, but because the government carried out the eviction, and NFC 
made ‘all possible efforts to engage and collaborate with the Government agency’, the 
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CAO was satisfied that NFC had complied with PS5.
212
 Oxfam has argued that, in 
these and other cases relating to TLA, ‘the application of safeguards for affected 
communities has not been sufficiently stringent.’
213
 In addition to not sanctioning the 
company involved or offering any redress to the displaced communities, the fact that 
the forced evictions were allowed to occur in the first place also revealed that the PS 
provided insufficient protection for communities at the planning and implementation 
stages of the project. 
 Overall, PS5 is a weak attempt by the IFC to alleviate the human rights 
impacts of the land acquisition projects it finances. The PS do not guarantee rights to 
communities which are well established in human rights law, particularly in relation to 
involuntary displacement. This in effect condones such outcomes and does not 
constitute a significant improvement on the existing legal frameworks regulating TLA. 
 
(c)  Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture that Respect Rights, 
Livelihoods and Resources (PRAI) 
At the July 2009 L’Aquila Summit, G8 governments agreed to support efforts to 
strengthen global governance for food security, including the initiation of negotiations 
on the future governance of agricultural investment.
214
 In 2010 an inter-agency 
working group was set up comprising the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the 
United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the 
World Bank. The group embarked on a two-year consultation process and in 2012 
approved the Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture that Respect 
Rights, Livelihoods and Resources (PRAI). The PRAI are a set of seven principles 
applicable to all stakeholders involved in TLA, with the aim of promoting ‘win-win’ 




                                                          
212
 Ibid at 35. 
213
 Oxfam op cit 196 at 10. 
214





  56 
Principle 1: Existing rights to land and associated natural resources are 
recognized and respected. 
Principle 2: Investments do not jeopardize food security but rather strengthen 
it. 
Principle 3: Processes relating to investment in agriculture are transparent, 
monitored, and ensure accountability by all stakeholders, within a proper 
business, legal, and regulatory environment. 
Principle 4: All those materially affected are consulted, and agreements from 
consultations are recorded and enforced. 
Principle 5: Investors ensure that projects respect the rule of law, reflect 
industry best practice, are viable economically, and result in durable shared 
value. 
Principle 6: Investments generate desirable social and distributional impacts 
and do not increase vulnerability. 
Principle 7: Environmental impacts of a project are quantified and measures 
taken to encourage sustainable resource use, while minimizing the 
risk/magnitude of negative impacts and mitigating them. 
The Principles have contributed to the internationally accepted norms and standards 
governing TLA. They re-emphasise the standards for TLA set out by the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to food and cover the key sustainability criteria elaborated by 
the CSR and CCM initiatives explored in Chapter III.
216
 The obvious limitation of 
PRAI is that they are non-binding principles and have no enforcement mechanism. 
Their brevity means that the PRAI also do not represent an attempt to create soft law 
principles that could be elevated to a binding treaty in the future. Moreover, the PRAI 
fail to acknowledge the binding nature of the obligations they do cover. Important 
principles in relation to land rights and food security are stated, but not sourced in 
international law, rather the agreement between international agencies from which 
they came. As the vast majority of states have ratified the ICESCR from which the 
rights to food and land arise, this constitutes a failure to tie the Principles to states 
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existing human rights obligations. Doing so would have given PRAI more teeth and 
increased the opportunities for affected communities to formulate complaints and 
opposition to TLA grounded in binding international law. The PRAI do not therefore 
offer communities affected by TLA any new mechanism by which to oppose or seek 
redress for any negative impacts that may be linked to TLA. 
 The PRAI also contain nothing on access to information, which is vital for 
communities to frame adequate and timely responses to interest in their land. As with 
the IFC’s PS5, Principle 4 requires investors to consult with communities affected by 
their investments, but their consent is not required. With no access to remedy provided 
for in the guidelines, and no means to enforce this even if it were included, it is hard to 
demonstrate what practical impact the PRAI will have on rural land users affected by 
TLA. 
 
(d)  Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, 
Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGT) 
The Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, 
Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGT, or the 
Voluntary Guidelines)
217
 are a set of global guidelines that promote secure tenure 
rights and equitable access to land, fisheries and forests, with an emphasis on 
vulnerable and marginalized peoples, in order to assist states in achieving ‘food 
security and progressive realization of the right to adequate food, poverty eradication, 
sustainable livelihoods, social stability, housing security, rural development, 
environmental protection and sustainable social and economic development.’
218
 The 
Voluntary Guidelines were officially endorsed by the Committee on World Food 
Security (part of the FAO) on 11 May 2012,
219
 and their implementation has since 
been encouraged by the G20, Rio+ 20 and the United Nations General Assembly. 
 The VGGT outline principles and practices that governments can refer to, and 
be held accountable for, when making laws and administering land, fisheries and 
forests rights. Their four core aims are to: 
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 Improve tenure governance by providing guidance on internationally accepted 
practices for systems that deal with the rights to use, manage and control land; 
 Contribute to the improvement and development of the policy, legal and 
organizational frameworks regulating the range of tenure rights that exist for 
land; 
 Enhance the transparency and improve the functioning of tenure systems; 
 Strengthen the capacity of administrators and other stakeholders involved in or 
affected by land governance.
220
 
The Guidelines address a much broader scope than PRAI, which have little to say on 
tenure security, access to land, or the broader governance of land tenure. Under the 
VGGT, states are required to recognize, respect, protect and promote tenure (and 
other) rights for all legitimate tenure rights holders.
221
 States must also ensure that 
tenure right holders, whether their tenure is recorded or not, are protected against the 
arbitrary loss of their tenure rights, including forced evictions,
222
 and provide 
effective, affordable and accessible judicial mechanisms to deal with infringements of 
legitimate tenure rights and to resolve disputes over tenure rights.
223
 Though the 
Guidelines recognise the primary responsibility of the State in land governance, non-
state actors including transnational businesses are reminded of their responsibilities to 
act with due diligence in their operations in order to avoid infringing on the human 
rights and legitimate tenure rights of local land users.
224
 These responsibilities include 
‘appropriate risk management systems to prevent and address adverse impact on 
human rights … [and] to provide remedy, including effective operational-level 
grievance mechanisms, where appropriate, where they have caused or contributed to 
adverse impacts on human rights and legitimate tenure rights.’
225
 
 The Voluntary Guidelines acknowledge that investment in land, fisheries and 
forests is necessary for economic growth and development, but recommend that 
safeguards are adopted in order to protect the human rights of rural people affected by 
such investments. Specifically in relation to TLA, states are required to: 
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provide safeguards to protect legitimate tenure rights, human rights, 
livelihoods, food security and the environment from risks that could arise 
from large-scale transactions in tenure rights. Such safeguards could include 
introducing ceilings on permissible land transactions and regulating how 
transfers exceeding a certain scale should be approved, such as by 
parliamentary approval. States should consider promoting a range of 
production and investment models that do not result in the large-scale transfer 




Part 3 of the VGGT emphasizes that investments affecting indigenous peoples must be 
carried out in accordance with the provisions of ILO Convention No. 169 and the 
Indigenous Peoples Declaration. 
 The VGGT are the first international instrument dedicated to land/tenure 
rights. Following on from the Minimum Principles proposed by the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to food, the Guidelines also provide an authoritative 
endorsement of the need to place human rights concerns at the heart of governance and 
legal frameworks regulating TLA. The VGGT fully take existing human rights law 
into account by providing that ‘[a]ll programmes, policies and technical assistance to 
improve governance of tenure through the implementation of these Guidelines should 
be consistent with States’ existing obligations under international law, including the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights 
instruments.’
227
 Moreover, unlike the PRAI, the Voluntary Guidelines specifically 
include and stress the importance of women’s human rights, by requiring states to 
‘ensure that women and girls have equal tenure rights and access to land … 
independent of their civil or marital status’ and that these rights must receive special 




 However, like the PRAI, the Guidelines are voluntary. A well supported test 
case at a domestic, regional or international level involving human rights violations 
alleged to have resulted from a TLA could certainly draw on the Guidelines as an 
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authoritative statement of norms and standards accepted by the international 
community. However, it is unclear at this stage what weight would be given to them 
by the relevant judicial bodies, or the extent to which they will be incorporated into 
domestic and/or regional land governance frameworks. The Guidelines themselves are 
not enforceable and include no remedial or enforcement mechanisms. 
 Though the VGGT highlight the responsibilities of foreign investors to respect 
human rights, their applicability and implementation is clearly aimed at the State. With 
SRSG Ruggie’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in mind, this 
constitutes a missed opportunity to further develop the international community’s 
response to the human rights obligations of business in an area where the activities of 
transnational enterprises have a great deal of influence on human rights outcomes. The 
Guidelines also fail to promote free, prior and informed consent as an international 
norm in relation to TLA by requiring States and investors only to ensure the 
participation and consultation of local communities in negotiations over land. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION AND WAYS FORWARD 
There is little doubt that foreign investors will continue to play a significant role in the 
development of low-income countries agricultural and other sectors. Yet the changes 
that foreign investment brings can be negative as well as positive, especially for 
people who are not empowered to protect and advance their rights. International trade 
and investment law place few requirements on investors to uphold human rights and 
attempts to integrate international human rights law into these frameworks have 
foundered repeatedly at the Doha Development Round of trade talks. At the 
international level the UN, global civil society, other non-state actors and some 
governments have begun developing new regulatory frameworks and soft law 
instruments designed to mitigate and alleviate the negative social and other impacts 
that TLA can bring. However, major improvements need to be made to the global 
governance and regulatory responses to TLA reviewed in this paper if they are to have 
a significant impact on the range of human rights violations that are occurring as a 
result of the global rush for land.  
The enforcement mechanisms of the UN remain weak, although there will be 
more scope for legal challenges to be made in relation to land, food and housing rights 
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at the UN level once the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR enters into force. This will 
allow affected communities and their representatives to petition the UN for redress of 
violations of these rights. The CESCR could draw on the Minimum Principles and 
Guidelines promulgated by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food and this could 
set new and progressive precedents for domestic and regional courts. Once the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights enters into operation it will be also be able to issue 
binding judgements relating to land, food and housing rights. 
The Performance Standards of the IFC do not meet the minimum standards for 
human rights protection in relation to TLA endorsed by the Special Rapporteur on the 
right to food and the Human Rights Council and should therefore be revised. They 
must require the consent of communities whose land and food rights are put at risk 
from land acquisitions and require that no forced evictions take place in order to make 
way for IFC-financed investment projects. These two changes would have important 
repercussions as the Performance Standards have a significant influence on the 
normative standards accepted and used by the international investment community.  
The Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture have contributed to 
the internationally accepted norms and standards governing TLA, but do not source 
those standards in international law and offer no new mechanism to which 
communities affected by TLA can appeal.  
The Voluntary Guidelines have received wide international acceptance but 
states and non-state actors are under no obligation to adhere to them. Moreover, they 
fail to promote the free, prior and informed consent of affected communities as a 
requirement for undertaking a land acquisition. This denies communities the essential 
power of a veto to demand and claim their rights, and must be amended. 
A recent Oxfam report on the challenge of ‘responsible investment’ concluded 
that ‘[t]he scale of the challenge we face in fully integrating poverty reduction and 
development issues into investment practice is immense … [and] will take many years 
and require huge levels of political and institutional support.’
229
 With the above 
changes, the responses to TLA outlined here hold some potential to improve the 
human rights impact of TLA over the long-term. In the short-medium term the 
momentum created at the international level by the recently UN General Assembly 
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endorsed Voluntary Guidelines could be built upon with the aim of creating a harder 
human rights instrument, such as a Declaration, that states could sign up to 
implementing. A binding human rights framework on responsible investment in land 
and agriculture could follow in the longer-term. Such a Declaration would remove the 
present legal uncertainty over the place of human rights in TLA. It could firmly 
establish community participation and consent, transparency and accountability in 
negotiations, accessible complaints and grievance procedures, and provision of 
effective redress as international legal norms in the context of transnational investment 
in land.  
Investment in such a vital resource as land, upon which the livelihoods, 
sustenance and cultural life of so many people depend, should bring benefits for all 
stakeholders concerned. A human rights approach to investment in land provides a 
broad and substantive basis for evaluating the social, economic and environmental 
impacts of land acquisitions, and goes far beyond the cost-benefit risk analysis 
currently used in international trade and investment law. Damage to human rights 
must no longer be seen as a ‘risk to be contained’, but central to the decision to go 
ahead with a land deal, as well as to the processes through which any transfer of land 
rights takes place. A human rights based regulatory framework puts governments and 
companies under pressure to justify deals in terms of their impact on widely accepted 
human rights norms. Elevating the VGGT into a more enforceable human rights law 
document would be the best legal response the international community can make to 
the impact the global rush for land is having on the human rights of rural land users. 
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